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Abstract 
In recent years, the concept of benefit-sharing has been proposed as a means of fostering 
the cooperative use of international rivers. Most of the relevant literature focuses on op-
portunities for the generation of net benefits from cooperation; however, little attention 
has so far been paid to specific mechanisms for benefit-sharing applied to the specific case 
of dams on international rivers. This study therefore fills this gap and asks both what in-
centives can be offered to encourage benefit-sharing and what benefit-sharing mechanisms 
can be identified. As a first step, it develops a conceptual framework for benefit-sharing in 
dam projects. The second step is to test this framework at existing dams on the Rivers 
Senegal, Columbia, Orange-Senqu, Nile and Zambezi and to explore the benefit-sharing 
mechanisms used by undertaking an extensive review of the literature. As its third step it 
analyses factors that influence benefit-sharing on the basis of a review of the literature and 
the insights gained from the cases analysed.  
The paper finds that the opportunities for deriving benefits from cooperation depend on 
the alignment of hydrological and political boundaries and the location of the dam in rela-
tion to them (hydro-political constellations) and on the aims and external effects of the 
individual dam. Incentives to cooperate on dams on shared rivers exist if: (i) cooperation 
will enable economic or financial limits to unilateral action to be overcome (Senegal); (ii) 
altering the design of a dam upstream will increase aggregate net benefits (Columbia); (iii) 
locating a dam upstream will increase aggregate net benefits (Orange-Senqu); (iv) com-
pensating for negative externalities upstream will preclude conflict (Nile); and (v) a joint 
dam on a border river will produce mutual benefits (Zambezi). The case studies show that 
various benefit-sharing mechanisms are possible: (A) costs are shared in relation to bene-
fits where dams are jointly owned (Senegal, Zambezi); (B) the party altering its unilateral 
dam design is compensated for any losses it incurs as a result of this alteration and net 
benefits of cooperation are shared (Columbia); and (C) the downstream state convinces the 
upstream state to build a dam, covers the cost and shares the net benefits derived from the 
dam (Orange-Senqu). The study further shows how political and institutional factors and 
the process influence the likelihood of the benefits of dams on shared rivers being shared. 
It also indicates that the neglect of negative environmental and social concern may lead to 
conflict and lengthy renegotiations at a later stage. These initial findings may provide 
guidance for riparian states engaged in and donors facilitating negotiations on dam pro-
jects on international rivers. From a scientific point of view, the typology developed 
should be tested further in additional case studies.  
Key words: international rivers, dams, hydropower, benefits, costs, externalities, benefit-
sharing mechanisms 
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Introduction 
The last decade has seen a debate on benefit-sharing on international rivers (Sadoff / Grey 
2002, 2005; Klaphake 2005; Phillips et al. 2006; Dombrowsky 2009). The main idea of 
the concept of benefit-sharing is to move from sharing water to sharing the benefits the 
users gain from its use. In principle, dams may play an important role in benefit-sharing 
schemes; however, their role has yet to be systematically explored. This is a serious deficit 
not least because of a renewed interest in multi-purpose dams in the context of develop-
ment and climate change. 
According to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2010; 2011), only 
33 per cent of the world’s hydropower potential has been exploited. In this respect, sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) lags far behind Asia (which exploits 22 per cent), South America 
(33 per cent), North Africa (69 per cent), Europe (75 per cent) and Australia (49 per cent): 
Africa uses only 7 or 8 per cent of its gross potential generating capacity (its economically 
feasible potential being around 1,000 TWh/year). As experts of Frost and Sullivan suggest 
is the current installed capacity low. In Angola, Cameroon, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon 
and Madagascar, for instance, averages between 2 and 4 per cent; Mozambique exploits 
17 per cent of its potential, Nigeria 7 per cent, South Africa 20 per cent and Zambia 29 per 
cent.  
The low rate of exploitation of hydropower potential in developing countries corresponds 
to a low rate of electrification, which is below the world average, with the SSA countries 
again the laggards. In 2009, 1.3 billion people, or around 20 per cent of the world popula-
tion, did not have access to electricity (even though access to electricity was one of the 
targets set at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 
2002) and, globally, almost 2.7 billion people (about 40 per cent) continue to rely on bio-
mass for cooking and heating. More than 95 per cent of them live either in SSA or devel-
oping Asia, 84 per cent in rural areas (IEA 2011). It is assumed that renewable energies, 
including photovoltaic, wind, biomass and hydropower, can play a role in electrification. 
According to World Bank estimates, Africa must develop an additional 7,000 megawatts 
(MW) of new electricity generation capacity per year in addition to implementing rural 
electrification programmes if undersupply is to be overcome; half of this 7,000 MW is to 
come from multi-purpose dams.1  
Estimates in connection with the Collaborative Programme of ADB, FAO, IFAD, IWMI 
and the World Bank (2007) suggest that SSA also has considerable as yet undeveloped 
irrigable land and that agricultural water remains underdeveloped. In SSA, only five per 
cent of the cultivated land is irrigated (in North Africa the figure is 40 per cent) (World 
Bank 2007, 9). The Collaborative Programme points to the significant potential for ex-
pansion, for improving the productivity of the five million irrigated hectares and for bring-
ing back into production the two million hectares of land that has been equipped with irri-
gation infrastructure but is currently unused (2007, xii). The New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) assumes that “agriculture will provide the engine for growth in 
Africa”, and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) 
refers to the need “to upgrade and rehabilitate existing large-scale irrigation schemes, 
                                                 
1 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/aicd_overview_english_no-embargo.pdf (p. 6), 
accessed 28 Feb. 2012. 
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and to develop new ones” (Africa Recovery 2004). Multi-purpose dams are one way to 
develop both hydropower and water supply for irrigation.2  
Dams may also play a role in climate change mitigation and adaptation. Hydropower is 
recognized as one of the “advanced, cleaner, more efficient, affordable and cost-effective 
energy technologies” (WSSD 2002) and as one of the best-developed non-fossil forms of 
electricity production.3 Furthermore, hydrological variability is expected to increase in the 
course of climate change (IPCC 2008). Dams can buffer flows and play a positive role in 
the management of hydrological variability and in adaptation to climate change. 
Given that most large rivers are shared by several countries, many of these new multi-
purpose dams will be built on transboundary rivers. Benefit-sharing can be seen as a 
means of ensuring this is done in a cooperative manner and conflicts over water or its use 
are avoided. Benefit-sharing can prevent conflicts by focusing on the sharing of the bene-
fits from a transboundary river rather than the mere sharing of the water itself (Sadoff / 
Grey 2002), and a transboundary approach to the selection of dam sites promises higher 
rates of return on investments if dams are constructed in optimal locations (where, for ex-
ample, evaporation rates are low owing to a reduced reservoir surface area or a high alti-
tude, or where storage volumes and river heads are high because dams are located in steep 
valleys). Benefit-sharing can be seen as the translation into practice of international water 
law, and specifically the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, and of the ab-
sence of harm, which the international and regional conventions emphasize.4  
Against this background, the Concept Note on Transboundary Water Resources Manage-
ment in Africa issued by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (BMZ 2011) envisages “the preparation and financing of relevant regionally 
coordinated investments and the creation of financial mechanisms,” and refers to benefit-
sharing as one criterion for the prioritization of support for regional projects.  
However, there is no denying that dams are among the most controversial infrastructure 
projects because of their significant environmental and social impacts (WCD 2000a). They 
interrupt river flows, change a river’s course, a river’s sedimentation regime and water 
quality, to mention but a few of their impacts (McCartney 2009). They often entail the 
acquisition of land and, therefore, the physical relocation and displacement of people. If 
such impacts are not adequately addressed, some already vulnerable populations are likely 
to be further impoverished, which will undermine development objectives (World Bank 
2001). 
The overall objective of this study is to analyse the essential elements and content of the 
benefit-sharing concept and its applicability to dams on shared rivers, given the impor-
                                                 
2 However, dams are no solution on their own: they are just one of several options – for water supply and 
for electricity generation. 
3 While dams may produce lower carbon emissions than fossil energy sources, they may emit other green-
house gases (GHG), such as methane. The precise GHG balance depends on the setting and on whether the 
reservoirs were cleared of vegetation prior to initial flooding. Further, reservoirs in the tropics and sub-
tropics release more GHGs than those in cold climates (Fearnside 2004; Chanudet et al. 2011). 
4 See the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997, 
not yet ratified), the Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes (1992) and the Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the Southern 
African Development Community (2000). 
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tance of these infrastructure projects and their highly controversial nature. However, we 
acknowledge (1) that benefit-sharing is a wide-ranging topic, of which dam development 
is just one component, and (2) that the generation of a ‘broad basket’ of possible benefits 
increases the chances of setting up successful benefit-sharing schemes. 
Given our focus on dams, we will consider the following questions at some length:  
— What do we mean by benefit-sharing, and what are the peculiarities of applying bene-
fit-sharing to dams on shared rivers?  
— Which types of benefit-sharing mechanisms are applicable to dams, how do they dif-
fer, and where can they be found in practice? 
— What political and institutional environment is conducive to the adoption of a benefit-
sharing approach to dams? 
The study is based on a review of the conceptual literature on benefit-sharing and of em-
pirical cases, and develops the concept further by considering its applicability to single 
and multi-purpose dams on shared rivers (Chapter 1). Selected case studies illustrate the 
empirical relevance of the benefit-sharing concept (Chapter 2). The study then looks be-
yond a mere economic approach and describes conditions that facilitate and hamper the 
introduction of benefit-sharing arrangements (Chapter 3), and finally presents general 
conclusions and recommendations for development cooperation (Chapter 4).  
1 Conceptualizing benefit-sharing on dams on international rivers 
1.1 The concept of benefit-sharing on international rivers 
The concept of benefit-sharing in the context of shared rivers entails a change from the 
mere volumetric allocation of water to the allocation of the benefits gained from the use of 
the river (Sadoff / Grey 2002; 2005; Klaphake 2005; Phillips et al. 2006; Dombrowsky 
2009). The prospect of potentially gaining higher benefits by cooperating rather by than 
maintaining the status quo or by taking unilateral action encourages states to cooperate 
with each other in their use of shared rivers. 
The concept suggests that countries can turn the perceived zero-sum game of water alloca-
tion, i. e. allocating more water to country A results in less water for country B, into a 
positive-sum game, i. e. a win-win situation in which all riparian countries are better off 
with cooperation than without (Biswas 1999; Giordano / Wolf 2003). This can be 
achieved by viewing the use of water from an economic perspective: rather than conceptu-
alizing water use in quantitative terms, states should conceive of the river as a productive 
resource and attempt to increase and ideally maximize the economic benefits from its use 
and so to share them that all parties are better off than they were with the status quo ante.5  
                                                 
5 Maximizing the economic benefits derived from a river may lead to a situation in which it is used at the 
expense of the environment and aquatic ecosystems or vulnerable social groups. This is not what is ad-
vocated here: we argue in the following that any development activity should avoid or fully compensate 
environmentally and socially negative effects. 
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The notion of benefit-sharing in the use of shared rivers has been advanced by Sadoff and 
Grey (2002) among others. They define benefit-sharing as ‘any action designed to change 
the allocation of costs and benefits associated with cooperation’ (Sadoff / Grey 2005). In 
doing so, they distinguish four categories of benefits through which cooperating states can 
produce win-win situations (Sadoff / Grey 2002):  
— benefits to the river: improve the ecological sustainability of the watershed; 
— benefits from the river: water-related economic benefits by developing irrigation, gen-
erating hydropower, improving flood control or enhancing navigation; 
— benefits due to reduced costs because of the river: reduction in political conflict and 
associated costs of conflict, when countries shift the policy focus from dispute to co-
operation and development; 
— benefits beyond the river: improved regional infrastructure, markets and trade ulti-
mately resulting from benefits derived because of the river (Sadoff / Grey 2002, 393, 
Table 1). 
Similarly, Phillips et al. (2006) argue that benefits can be generated in the economic, the 
environmental or in the security arenas and that activities in these various spheres may 
have spill-over effects. They propose to identify security, economic and environmental 
drivers in international river basins and, on that basis, opportunities for development at 
various levels (household, sub-national, national, regional, global) within each of these 
spheres. 
Building upon these approaches, a concept paper on benefit-sharing and transboundary 
water management by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) visualizes 
this idea as a benefit-sharing wheel of eight categories of benefits: economic (i. e. eco-
nomic growth through enhanced economic activity and trade); environmental (i. e. conser-
vation to protect the waters of the basin); agricultural (i. e. enhanced agricultural produc-
tion and trade in agricultural goods); social (i. e. reduction in poverty); political (i. e. en-
hanced political stability in the basin); hydrological (i. e. secured seasonal flow regimes); 
physical (i. e. negotiated changes to the physical landscape of the basin, such as through 
dams); and commercial (i. e. enhanced trade in and outside the basin) (SADC s. a.). How-
ever, while it is certainly useful to distinguish areas in which action can be taken and 
benefits can be created, from an economic point of view it is more common to confine the 
types of benefits to the economic, environmental, social and political arenas. For instance, 
increased productivity or trade in the agricultural sector would usually be regarded an 
economic benefit. 
The benefit categories developed by Sadoff and Grey, Phillips et al. (2006) and SADC can 
serve as a starting point for benefit generation. They can also contribute to a deeper under-
standing of the range of sectors that can be included in generating benefits from coopera-
tion and of the possible size of the “basket of benefits” (Phillips et al. 2006).  
Going beyond benefit generation, Dombrowsky (2009; 2010a; 2010b) seeks to determine 
what incentives each of the riparian states involved has to negotiate and enlarge the basket 
of benefits and how riparians might distribute or share costs and benefits. To that end, she 
argues that it is useful to analyse the benefits and the potential negative and positive exter-
nal effects of actual or planned water uses by individual states. The advantage of this ap-
proach is that it shows directly how cooperation alters the payoffs for each participating 
state compared to the status quo or unilateral action. This can then be used as a basis for 
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identifying a benefit-sharing mechanism which so changes the allocation of costs and 
benefits that every state will be better off compared to the status quo.  
In the following, this approach will be applied to dams, and various kinds of benefits and 
external effects associated with dams will be analysed.  
1.2 Benefits and external effects associated with dams 
Our starting point for thoughts on benefit-sharing in the context of dams on shared rivers 
is the interest of individual basin states in developing their water resources for the benefit 
of their national economies. That interest may extend to energy production, the expansion 
of irrigated agriculture to meet food and energy security needs, the mitigation of hazard-
ous floods and the improved navigability of rivers to enable trade potential to be tapped 
(see Table 1). 
However, the generation of benefits through the construction of a dam in one country may 
have external effects both on local populations and on other countries. Such “external ef-
fects” or “externalities” occur when the use of water by one agent directly affects the use 
of water by another, and when these effects are not “mediated by prices” (Mas-Collel et al. 
1995, 52), i. e. when they are not reflected in the cost-benefit calculus of the agent causing 
them. In the case of transboundary externalities, an upstream dam may, for instance, pro-
duce negative externalities downstream by reducing downstream water flow for irrigation, 
navigation or drinking water supply, or by increasing peak floods. Conversely, the up-
stream dam may also produce positive externalities downstream when the upstream dam 
improves flood protection downstream. However, the construction of a dam downstream 
may also produce a negative externality upstream by extending the reservoir across the 
border into the upstream state, where it inundates land on its territory. Thus gaining benefits 
  
Table 1: Externalities of upstream dams in a downstream country 
Benefits to upstream state A from a single or 
multi-purpose dam Externalities in downstream state B 
Hydroelectricity 
(-) changed flow and sedimentation regime 
(-) peak flows 
(-) seasonal imbalance 
Flood control 
(-) changed flow and sedimentation regime 
(-) peak flows 
(+) regularized flow 
Irrigation / drinking water 
(-) changed flow and sedimentation regime 
(-) peak flows 
(-) seasonal imbalance 
(-) high to low water extractions 
(+) regularized flow 
Improved navigability (+) increased trade 
Source:      authors’ own compilation  
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from a dam on the territory of one riparian country may have negative or positive external 
effects on other riparian countries. On a transboundary river (i. e. a river crossing an inter-
national border) these effects may occur downstream or upstream; on rivers forming state 
borders they tend to be more reciprocal (Dombrowsky 2007; 2010a; 2010b).  
Table 1 explores potential benefits of building a dam in upstream state A and potential 
associated positive and negative externalities in downstream state B in greater detail. 
Multi-purpose dams combine the externalities of single-purpose projects. 
1.3 Hydro-political constellations and incentive structures for negotiations on 
sharing the benefits of dams 
It will be clear from the above that the opportunities and incentives for cooperation on 
dams on shared rivers and the content and applicability of benefit-sharing mechanisms 
depend on the following factors:  
— The location of a dam on a shared river (hydro-political constellation). The defining 
element in the location of a dam is the relationship between the river and the national 
border. Two types of river-border relationships can be distinguished: (i) a 
transboundary river crosses an international border from the upstream country to the 
downstream country, the dam being located in either the upstream or the downstream 
country or on the border itself; (ii) the river forms the international border, the dam 
being located in both riparian countries. 
— The purpose(s) of a dam on a shared river is (are) to achieve national (or sub-national) 
development objectives.  
— Each state’s specific interest in cooperation. 
The hydro-political constellation and the purpose(s) therefore determine a dam’s benefit, 
cost and externality streams. In the following, the study identifies typical constellations 
and, for each constellation, potential reasons and incentives for states to cooperate. In do-
ing so, it initially conceptualizes states as unitary actors. This, however, is an abstraction 
for analytical reasons in order to understand the incentive structure at the international 
level. This does not imply that we suggest that states are unitary actors. To the contrary, 
international negotiations have to be conceptualized as two-level games (Putnam 1988): at 
the international level, state representatives negotiate international agreements that seek to 
generate net benefits for the country as a whole. At the national and sub-national level, the 
political process determines whether a respective international agreement will be ratified. 
Depending on the opportunities of affected population to voice their concerns, this na-
tional level process may – and we argue that it should – involve negotiations on the com-
pensation of and benefit-sharing with those who are negatively affected by the interna-
tional agreement.  
Hydro-political constellation (1): a dam on a transboundary river – externalities 
downstream  
The dam is located in upstream state A and produces positive and/or negative externalities 
in downstream state B (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Hydro-political constellation (1): a dam on a transboundary river in upstream 
state A with externalities in downstream state B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
The possible reasons for cooperating in this constellation include: 
(i) Financial or economic constraints on unilateral action. Where unilateral action is 
subject to financial constraints, a state lacks the financial resources and/or technical 
capacity needed to build the dam alone, although it would be economically viable, and 
therefore asks co-riparian countries to contribute towards its cost and offers to share 
the benefits generated by the dam (as in the case of the River Senegal, see Section 
2.1). Where unilateral action is subject to economic constraints, the project does not 
make economic sense for the upstream state on its own. An example would be an up-
stream dam the cost of which would exceed benefits within upstream country A. If the 
dam generates positive externalities for the downstream state (by regulating flows, for 
example), the project may become economically viable if the downstream state con-
tributes towards the cost of the project. In this case, the project is rational only collec-
tively, not unilaterally, since it pays off only if the benefits to all riparians are consid-
ered in the cost-benefit analysis and if they all contribute to the project costs, e. g. in 
proportion to the benefits they will derive from the project (for a more detailed expla-
nation, see Dombrowsky 2009). 
(ii) Altered dam design increases aggregate net benefits. An altered, jointly agreed dam 
design that takes external effects into account increases overall aggregate net benefits 
at basin level. The downstream state participates in the establishment of an upstream 
project to increase the basin-wide benefits of the project compared with the upstream 
state’s unilateral alternative. This is possible if the alteration of the project increases 
aggregate net benefits. However, the altered design typically leaves the upstream 
country worse off (otherwise, the upstream state would have pursued this alternative 
from the beginning). In that case, the downstream country will approach the upstream 
country and ask for an alteration of the dam design and compensate it for any conse-
quent losses (as in the case of the Columbia River, see Section 2.2). The remaining 
benefits of cooperation are then shared (for a more detailed explanation, see 
Dombrowsky 2009).  
(iii) The downstream country wants to build a dam on the territory of an upstream coun-
try. This is the case, for example, if the dam site is more favourable for the achieve-
ment of the downstream country’s national objectives than an alternative on its own 
territory in terms of, say, flood control (an example being Iraq’s 1946 agreement with 
Turkey to build a dam on Turkish territory). Locating the dam in another state thus 
produces higher aggregate net benefits than a project alternative within national 
boundaries. The downstream country at least contributes to the cost of financing the 
investment and of operating the dam? The upstream country has an incentive to coop-
erate if it derives net benefits from the project (as in the case of the Lesotho High-
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lands Water Project, see Section 2.3). While the upstream state is interested in build-
ing a dam in case (ii), it is the downstream state that is interested in doing so in case (iii).  
Hydro-political constellation (2): a dam on a transboundary river – externalities upstream 
The dam is located in the downstream state close to the international border, which causes 
externalities in the upstream state in the form of flooding.  
Figure 2: Hydro-political constellation (2): a dam on a transboundary river in down-
stream state B with externalities in state A 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
Possible reasons for cooperation in this constellation include: 
(i) The downstream country wishes to maintain good-neighbourly relations. It therefore 
compensates the upstream state for damage and shares the benefits of the project with 
it (e. g. Aswan High Dam, see Section 2.4). As will be explained below, the construc-
tion of the Aswan High Dam entailed cooperation under an international treaty that 
provided, among other things, for a single compensatory payment for flooding up-
stream. However, it is questionable whether this was sufficient to offset damage 
caused by the reservoir upstream (in which case, it would not be reasonable to speak 
of benefit-sharing).  
(ii) The downstream country wishes to avoid negative externalities affecting the upstream 
country (e.g. Bui Dam, Ghana). As shown below, an international dimension was en-
tirely avoided in the Bui case, there therefore being no benefit-sharing in the end, nor 
any damage upstream.  
Hydro-political constellation (3): a dam on a border formed by a transboundary river  
The dam is located where a river flows from state A to state B.  
  
Figure 3: Hydro-political constellation (3): a dam on a border crossed by a 
transboundary river 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
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The reason for cooperation in this constellation is: 
— Benefits can be gained only though cooperation, but the externalities are asymmet-
rical. An agreement is required to build on the border between upstream and down-
stream states. The cost of building the dam is shared according to the allocation of 
benefits. In addition, the asymmetrical externalities can be compensated for with a 
side-payment by downstream state B to upstream state A or vice versa. Examples are 
the ‘friendship dams’ on the Turkish-Syrian and Turkish-Bulgarian borders (not in-
cluded in the study). 
Whether and how state B compensates state A or vice versa, and what benefit-sharing 
mechanism is created, depends on the externalities and the incentive structure. This case 
represents an intermediate constellation between constellations 1 and 2, because territory 
of the upstream state is flooded and the downstream state may suffer the effects of up-
stream water storage and/or release. However, unlike the states in constellations 1 and 2, 
those in constellation 3 cannot act unilaterally.  
Hydro-political constellation (4): a dam on a border river 
The dam is located on a border-forming river. Externalities will therefore affect both 
states.  
Figure 4: Hydro-political constellation (4): a dam on a border river 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
The reason for cooperation in this constellation is: 
— Benefits can be exploited only through cooperation, but the externalities are symmet-
rical. An agreement is required to build the dam on a river which forms the border be-
tween the riparian states. Benefits can therefore be gained only through cooperation, 
and benefits and externalities are in principle symmetrical. The cost of building the 
dam is shared according to the allocation of benefits (e. g. the Itaipu and Kariba 
Dams; see Section 2.5).  
1.4 Negotiating benefit-sharing mechanisms 
The states then enter into negotiations to “internalize” the external effects in a comprehen-
sive cost-benefit calculus. In the process of internalizing the externalities, negative exter-
nalities are turned into costs and positive externalities into benefits. Ideally, all related 
costs (including capital, operating and maintenance, opportunity and external costs) and 
all related benefit streams (including direct and indirect use values, positive externalities 
and intrinsic values) are taken into account in the sharing of the benefits of dams (see, for 
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example, Rogers et al. 2002) and all parties affected (including local population) have a 
seat or are represented at the table.  
The first step, therefore, is for the negotiating parties to determine whether cooperation 
will produce net benefits and so whether it has the potential to make all the various parties 
better off compared with the status quo or unilateral action. This is the case if the net bene-
fits of cooperation minus the net benefits of no or unilateral action are positive. Net bene-
fits are the sum of all benefit categories minus the sum of all cost categories. 
As their second step, the parties have to determine how cooperation will affect each 
party’s cost-benefit calculus. Given that individual parties may be made worse off by co-
operation compared with no or unilateral action, it may be helpful to use side-payments 
and issue-linkages during the negotiations (Klaphake 2005; Dinar 2006; Dombrowsky 
2009; 2010a; 2010b). A side-payment is monetary compensation for losses incurred by 
one party as part of an overall deal vis-à-vis no or unilateral action made by those who 
gain from cooperation. Thereby, the negotiating partners will make sure that nobody is 
worse off after the deal than before it. Issues are linked when separate areas of negotiation 
are discussed simultaneously with a view to a joint settlement being reached (on, say, wa-
ter and security or trade). They can be understood as side-payments in kind, the partners 
coming to a quid pro quo arrangement by linking issues, rather than making a monetary 
side-payment. Issue-linkage has the advantage of avoiding the loss of face that might be 
seen to be associated with a side-payment (see, for example, Mäler 1990). 
However, as the definition of benefit-sharing implies that all affected parties will be better 
off than they were before, not every side-payment or issue-linkage necessarily constitutes 
a form of benefit-sharing per se. A side-payment that compensates only for losses, but 
does not make the party better off compared with the status quo would not be considered 
benefit-sharing. For example, a one-time monetary payment by state A to state B for dam-
ages caused in B by a dam in A may not be considered benefit-sharing if the payment does 
not make state B better off compared to the situation without the dam in place.  
After compensating for potential losses incurred by individual negotiating partners, the 
parties can share the net benefits of cooperation. One way is to split the net benefits of 
cooperation equally, unless there are good reasons for unequal splitting. 
Benefit-sharing is easiest if all cost and benefit streams associated with the dam are quan-
tified in monetary terms. However, environmental and social costs in particular are not 
usually expressed in market prices and their monetization can be methodologically com-
plex (as well as time-consuming and costly) (see, for example, Garrod / Willis 1999). The 
results are often disputed and it is also disputed in what way negative effects can be ade-
quately compensated. An alternative is to describe in qualitative terms those costs and 
benefit streams that cannot easily be quantified. All the riparian states affected must ulti-
mately perceive the project as beneficial – or at least acceptable – and as better than doing 
nothing or acting unilaterally.  
Note that in practice the affected local population is typically not directly represented in 
international negotiations, but international negotiations should be conceived as two-level 
games. Therefore, full compensation of negative social and environmental effects requires 
governments negotiate with those affected and ensure that they are at least fully compen-
sated or that they even enjoy a portion of the benefits of cooperation at the domestic level. 
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The examples in Chapter 2 will show that negative social and environmental effects are 
often not adequately addressed.  
On the basis of the above description and more detailed analyses in Chapter 2 below, three 
types of benefit-sharing mechanisms can be distinguished:  
(A) In the case of jointly owned infrastructure, costs are usually born in proportion to ben-
efits gained (Rivers Senegal, Zambezi and Paraná).  
(B) When the design of a unilateral project upstream is changed to increase aggregate net 
benefits, the party altering its dam design is compensated for any losses incurred as a 
result of the alteration (in the form of monetary compensation, for instance), and the 
net benefits of cooperation compared to unilateral action by the upstream country are 
shared (in monetary terms or in kind) (River Columbia); 
(C) When a downstream country builds a dam upstream in order to increase aggregate net 
benefits, it can be expected to cover investment and external costs, with the upstream 
state participating in the benefits of the project and the two countries sharing the net 
benefits of the joint project compared to the downstream country’s unilateral alterna-
tive (River Orange-Senqu). 
In each case, the benefit-sharing mechanism consists of the combination of all the ele-
ments used to balance costs and benefits and may or may not include compensation.  
2 Case studies 
In the following we analyse a number of cases discussed in the literature in which negotia-
tions on dams on international rivers took place, and consider whether a benefit-sharing 
mechanism was involved and, if so, how it can be described. We explicitly also analyze 
whether negative social and environmental effects were included in the cost-benefit calcu-
lus. The cases discussed are dams on the Rivers Senegal, Columbia, Orange-Senqu, Nile 
and Zambezi, representing the different hydro-political constellations and incentive struc-
tures introduced in Chapter 1; this is followed by some notes on the River Paraná. Each 
case-study description includes an analysis of the international / transboundary benefit-
sharing mechanism, of the manner in which the various states addressed environmental 
and social effects associated with the dams and of the institutional arrangements made. 
2.1 Dams on the River Senegal: overcoming financial constraints of unilateral 
action  
Project description and benefit-sharing mechanism  
The development of the River Senegal is a regional project based on French colonial ef-
forts to utilize the entire flow of the River Senegal for economic purposes. In 1963, having 
gaining their independence in 1960, all the basin states declared the Senegal to be an in-
ternational river, thus taking a non-territorial view from the outset.  
Transboundary cooperation on the River Senegal was introduced at a time when develop-
ment was facing major difficulties (Yu 2011, 12–13):  
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— low GDP per capita (in constant US$ for the year 20006): US$197 in Mali, US$377 in 
Mauritania, US$448 in Senegal; 
— low agricultural productivity in Senegal, droughts in Mali and a lack of cheap electric-
ity for the industrial sectors in Senegal and Mauritania; and  
— frequent floods and droughts that hampered reliable agricultural production.  
Mali, Mauritania and Senegal were all interested in increasing energy supply through hy-
dropower development. In addition, Mauritania and Senegal wanted to expand irrigated 
agriculture to increase food security, and Mali had an interest in increasing the navigabil-
ity of the River Senegal to ship natural resources to the Atlantic Ocean. After years of 
partly discordant negotiations and failed attempts to set up robust river management insti-
tutions, Mauritania, Mali and Senegal established the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur 
du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS) in 1972.  
The aim of the OMVS was to build two dams – Diama and Manantali – with a view to 
achieving food self-sufficiency by expanding irrigated agriculture, developing hydropower 
to increase the supply and lower the cost of electricity and enabling the river to be navi-
gated to the Atlantic Ocean so that mineral resources might be exploited. The Diama Dam, 
located on the river delta in Senegal and Mauritania, was designed for flood control, irri-
gation and drinking water provision and to prevent seawater intrusion. The Manantali 
Dam, in Mali, was intended to enable hydropower to be generated, irrigation water to be 
stored and the river to be navigated. As none of the states was able to finance the dams on 
its own, the creation of the OMVS also provided a means of mobilizing the assistance of 
the international donor community. Both dams are owned by all three countries, which is 
quite exceptional on a transboundary river. 
In view of their differing needs, the three states negotiated a cost-sharing key based on 
projected benefits. This Clé de Répartition, was adopted by the OMVS Council of Minis-
ters in 1985 (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Cost-sharing key, adopted by the OMVS Council of Ministers in 1985 
 Mauritania’s share Senegal’s share Mali’s share 
Cost allocation across sectors (energy, 
irrigation, navigation) 
22.6 % 42.1 % 35.3 % 
Allocation of benefits 
Energy 15 % 33 % 52 % 
Irrigated agriculture (375,000 ha) 31 % 58 % 11 % 
Navigation (access to Atlantic Ocean)  12 % 6 % 82 % 
Source:    Yu (2011, 19) 
The Senegal case falls under hydro-political constellation (1), a dam on a transboundary 
river – externalities downstream. In terms of incentive structure, it can be considered a 
combination of case (i) – none of the riparians can finance a dam on its own – and case 
(iii) – locating the dam upstream increases aggregate net benefits. The benefit-sharing 
                                                 
6 Figures quoted from Yu (2011).  
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mechanism corresponds to type (A): joint infrastructure: costs borne in proportion to bene-
fits received, however, as argued below social and environmental effects were not consid-
ered in the initial benefit-sharing scheme. 
The two dams were built in the 1980s with a US$ 620 million loan from twelve donors 
(Yu 2011, 15). The Manantali Dam was completed in 1988, but without the power station. 
It did not begin to produce electricity until 2001, following a second donor package in 
1997. 
Social and environmental effects 
Social and environmental effects were not addressed during the planning and construction 
phases. The dams led to deforestation, the resettlement of 12,000 people (for Manantali), 
the replacement of traditional recessional agriculture with irrigation agriculture, a reduc-
tion in fisheries and an increase in water-borne diseases. No provision was made for com-
pensation mechanisms.  
It was to be 1998 before the OMVS set up an Environmental Impact Mitigation and Moni-
toring Programme to address the environmental and social impacts of the Manantali and 
Diama Dams. This was financed from the resources of a 1997 Regional Hydropower De-
velopment Project set up by donors to improve hydroelectricity production and distribu-
tion.  
In 2002, the OMVS countries signed a Water Charter, which added sustainability and en-
vironmental protection to the OMVS mandate. It requires an Environmental Action Plan, 
extends the membership of the Permanent Water Commission to include non-
governmental stakeholders (farmers, fishermen’s associations, NGOs, etc.) and defines 
mechanisms for reviewing new projects (Yu 2011, 21–23). 
Institutional set-up 
The OMVS is a quadrilateral river basin organization (Guinea joined in 2005) with four 
permanent organs: the Conference of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Min-
isters, the High Commission and the Permanent Water Commission. 
The authorities operating the Diama and Manantali Dams, the Société de Gestion et 
d’Exploitation du Barrage de Diama (SOGED) and the Société de Gestion de l'Energie de 
Manantali (SOGEM), were founded in 1997 under the Convention portant création de 
l’agence de gestion de l’exploitation de Diama and the Convention portant création de 
l’agence de gestion de l’énergie de Manantali. Their task is to operate, maintain and repair 
the dams and associated structures. SOGEM and SOGED each consist of a Council of 
Ministers, an Administration Council and a Directorate-General. SOGEM’s budget is 
funded from the sale of energy, SOGED from fees for the use of water for irrigation and as 
drinking water. The member governments provide additional funding. The three member 
states are equally represented in SOGEM and SOGED. 
Under donor pressure, the operation of Manantali was handed over to the South African 
utility ESKOM after an international call for tenders supervised by SOGEM. ESKOM’s 
task is to operate and maintain energy production facilities and transmission lines, to dis-
tribute energy from Manantali to all three member states and to collect fees and hand them 
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over to SOGEM. SOGEM determines electricity prices in agreement with the Council of 
Ministers (Kirschke 2010, 13–17).  
Lessons learnt 
The OMVS presents a mixed picture. The Clé de Répartition can be considered a success 
to the extent that the countries agreed on expected benefits from cooperation and to share 
costs in relation to expected benefit streams. The OMVS is jointly managed, and the dams 
are jointly owned through the OMVS which is quite exceptional for dams on transbound-
ary rivers. This, however, has enabled conflicts which related to the use of the waters of 
the River Senegal and to the construction of dams, to be managed in a constructive man-
ner. 
Politically, the organization is therefore deemed to be a success. This is partly due to the 
definitions laid down by the member countries for crucial parts of the infrastructure coop-
eration in two conventions: the Convention Concerning the Legal Status of Jointly-Owned 
Structures (1978) and the Convention Concerning the Financing of Jointly-Owned Struc-
tures (1982) (Ayibotele s. a., 7): 
— all structures are the joint property of the OMVS member states; 
— investment costs and operating expenses are shared by the owners according to the 
benefits they derive from the structures; and  
— each co-owner guarantees repayment of the loans extended to the OMVS by the inter-
national donor community for the construction of the relevant infrastructure. 
The OMVS was preceded by a history of cooperation in the Senegal Basin, most impor-
tantly under the Bamako Convention,7 signed by Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal and Mali in 
1963. The Convention accords the River Senegal international status (Ayibotele s. a., 5). 
This is pre-dated by French colonial plans for the economic exploitation of the whole of 
the Senegal River Basin.  
However, a range of negative factors have impeded the OMVS (KfW s. a.; Kirschke 2010, 
16–18; Yu 2011, 20–23; Kipping 2005):  
First, the funds provided by the member states proved insufficient, making continued do-
nor contributions necessary. ESKOM is also suffering from the bad paying habits of its 
customers. This is also why SOGEM is inadequately funded. SOGED, funded from the 
sale of water, suffers from similar problems.  
Second, soaring land prices due to infrastructure development led to internal conflict in 
Mauritania, which spilled over into a border war between Mauritania and Senegal in 
1989–1991. 
Third, the OMVS is heavily dependent on donor support. Both dams were built with a 
loan from the international donor community, and the 1997 Regional Hydropower Devel-
opment Project, which was to revive the plans for electricity production and distribution, 
was also established with donor support. This was deemed necessary, because  
                                                 
7 Convention de Bamako Rélative à l’Aménagement général du Bassin du Fleuve Sénégal. 
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— the economic benefits of expanding irrigated agriculture and producing electricity that 
were envisaged by the OMVS were not achieved. In addition, with many local farmers 
preferring the less risky and less capital-intensive flood recessional agriculture, the 
countries agreed to change the dam management regime to allow more traditional ag-
riculture. The additional release included a trade-off calculation between additional 
water releases and the remaining hydropower capacity; 
— the principle of equal representation in all the OMVS institutions, though politically 
useful, led to institutional paralysis since it precluded dynamic responses to any social 
and environmental impacts that ensued; and  
— the focus on benefits at national level (national economic development), at the ex-
pense of the people affected by the dams led to a severing of the link between national 
and local development.  
A lack of regional funding and dependence on donor finance ultimately proved problem-
atic and raises the question of ownership. Dam construction and environmental protection 
measures are essentially donor-initiated and donor-funded. While the various countries 
have an interest in creating and maintaining electricity infrastructure, institutional man-
agement and local funding appear to be the key issues for the management of the OMVS. 
Sources: Yu (2011, 12–26); KfW (s. a.); AfDB (1988); Kirschke (2010). For further in-
formation see Alam, Dione and Jeffrey (2009) and Kipping (2005). 
2.2 Dams on the Columbia River: altered dam design increases aggregate net 
benefits 
Project description and benefit-sharing mechanism 
The Columbia River is shared by Canada and the United States. Plans by upstream Canada 
to utilize the Kootenay and Columbia Rivers for hydropower production would have 
threatened hydroelectric power generation in the United States at the Bonneville, Grand 
Coulee and John Day Dams. An additional threat to downstream hydropower was the fre-
quent flooding as the Columbia and the Kootenay Rivers spilled across the border into the 
United States. The United States therefore tried to induce Canada to change its upstream 
water use plans to safeguard and improve downstream hydropower production. Negotia-
tions on these issues finally resulted in the Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of 
the Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin, signed in 1961 and ratified in 1964.8  
Under the Columbia River Treaty, Canada was required to build three large storage dams 
– Duncan, Keenleyside and Mica, all built during the 1960s and 1970s – for flood protec-
tion in the United States and power generation in Canada and the United States. In return 
for providing flood control and the additional hydropower benefits generated downstream 
thanks to its reservoirs, Canada received from the United States in advance half of the 
value of the downstream flood protection and gained the right to half of the additional 
electricity generated downstream in the United States (Columbia River Treaty, Articles II-
VIII). 
                                                 
8 For a history of the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Columbia River Treaty see Muckleston 
(s. a., 22–30). 
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To operationalize the provision of hydropower, the Canadian province of British Colum-
bia, which assumed responsibilities from the Canadian federal government under the 
Treaty, sold the electricity to US buyers “on a 30-year contract for an upfront payment. 
The total of the upfront payment for flood control and electricity sales was sufficient to 
pay for all the Treaty projects in British Columbia […]. The electricity from that facility is 
the sole property of British Columbia Hydro, the province’s power utility” (Égré et al. 
2002, 47).  
Canada was thus required to build dams upstream to prevent flooding in the United States. 
In return, it was entitled to two forms of compensation over the 60-year life span of the 
Treaty:  
— half of the additional electricity that the United States was able to generate at its exist-
ing Bonneville, Grand Coulee and John Day Dams downstream. British Columbia 
“sold the first 30 years of its ‘Entitlement’ to a group of US utilities for $254.4 mil-
lion” (Yu 2008, 35); and  
— “one-half the value of the flood damage reduction the reservoirs in Canada would 
help to protect in the US floodplains” (Yu 2008, 35).  
This effectively financed the entire Canadian infrastructure required under the Columbia 
River Treaty.  
The intention of the deal was to increase and share aggregate net benefits through an al-
tered design of the dams planned upstream (case (ii) for hydro-political constellation (1)). 
However, Krutilla (1967, 194–195) argues that the reservoirs built under the Columbia 
River Treaty in fact turned out to be cheaper for Canada than unilateral alternatives. Con-
versely, the Treaty provisions proved to be more expensive for the United States than a 
domestic alternative. The Treaty therefore had a cost-saving effect for Canada, but proved 
costly for the United States. Hence, while the intention was to generate net benefits from 
cooperation as compared with Canada’s unilateral alternative(s), it cannot be fully estab-
lished whether the final result proved to be an effective benefit-sharing mechanism. 
Social and environmental effects 
The Canadian dams required the resettlement of 2,300 people. During the construction 
phase in the 1960s and 1970s, 60,000 hectares of land were flooded, indigenous archaeo-
logical and burial sites were submerged, and environmentally sensitive areas disappeared. 
At the time, there were no adequate mechanisms to compensate for these losses (Égré 
2007, 48). 
It was only in the early 1990s, shortly before the expiry of the 30-year period in which 
British Columbia sold its share of downstream electricity, which local communities and 
indigenous people in particular demanded changes to the sales system and a share of the 
benefits generated from electricity sales. In 1992, local government at the regional district 
level and tribal councils formed the Columbia Treaty Committee, which entered into ne-
gotiations with the province of British Columbia for a local benefit-sharing mechanism. 
The result was the setting-up of the Columbia Basin Trust (Égré 2007, 48). 
Under the Trust arrangements, a Columbia Basin Management Plan was developed. The 
Trust was endowed with CAN$295 million from the province of British Columbia. This 
was equivalent to 5 per cent of the province’s share of the downstream benefits. The funds 
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have been used to build power stations on the existing reservoirs and to purchase and ex-
pand generating capacity at the Waneta and Brilliant Dams. The power projects are de-
signed to assist the region’s economic development. The funds are also used for invest-
ment in non-power projects, such as business loans for basin residents. In addition, the 
province contributed CANS$2 million towards operating costs for the period 1991–2010 
(Égré 2007, 48–49; Columbia Basin Trust website at http://www.cbt.org/Investments/? 
Power, accessed 3 Aug. 2011). 
Institutional set-up 
No river basin organizations were established under the Columbia River Treaty. However, 
the Treaty negotiations were institutionally complex: the province of British Columbia 
‘held veto power over conclusion of the [… Treaty] because within the Canadian federal 
system provinces have sovereignty over their natural resources and share in decision mak-
ing when natural resources are involved’ (Muckleston s. a., 29). On the Canadian side, this 
complicated the search for a consensus as the basis for negotiations with the US authori-
ties (Muckleston s. a., 13, 29–30).  
Unlike the Columbia River Treaty, the Columbia Basin Trust is governed by a board of 
twelve directors, who are nominated by the five regional districts in the Columbia River 
Basin, the Ktunaxa Nation Council and the province of British Columbia (Égré 2007, 49). 
The Trust invests its capital and manages its assets. In cooperation with advisory commit-
tees of basin residents, the Trust uses its revenues to fund projects in the areas of ‘envi-
ronment; economic development; social; education and training; youth initiatives; arts, 
culture and heritage’ (Égré 2007, 49).  
Lessons learnt 
It is not clear whether the Columbia River Treaty can be regarded as a success in benefit-
sharing terms, given that, financially, Canada benefited more than the United States. Ac-
cording to the analysis by Krutilla (1967), the United States was in fact worse off than it 
would have been if it had adopted unilateral solutions and built additional hydropower 
capacity outside the Columbia River Basin.  
Politically, the Treaty was made possible by a history of cooperation between the two coun-
tries before the Columbia River Treaty was signed and by the political will to find a perma-
nent solution to the problem of managing transboundary rivers. Cooperation dates back to 
1783, when a settlement was reached on navigational rights for citizens of the two countries. 
When economic expansion in the United States and Canada led to increased use of boundary 
waters, the two countries entered into negotiations on the Boundary Waters Treaty, which 
was signed in 1909, becoming the first treaty to standardize bilateral cooperation on bound-
ary waters beyond a needs-based ‘ad hoc’ approach (Muckleston s. a., 22). 
Apart from being able to look back on a long history of cooperation, the projects estab-
lished under the Columbia River Treaty were managed so effectively that they led to sub-
stantial income generation for the Canadian project owners. This enabled the endowment 
of the Columbia Basin Trust. The coordinated efforts of local government and the people 
affected to obtain compensation for the social and environmental damage led to the active 
involvement of local communities in the creation of the Trust. Through its governing 
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structure, these communities are also directly involved in choosing the projects on which 
the funds will be spent.  
The Columbia Basin Trust was established because of the neglect of the social impact at 
the time the Canadian reservoirs were built. The use of the revenues then needed to be 
renegotiated after the first phase of the Treaty with the population directly affected as local 
people forced the Canadian authorities to introduce a participatory mechanism through 
which people in the affected localities could have a say in the use of some of the income 
generated by the Canadian dams. 
Sources: Columbia River Treaty (1961); Égré (2007); Égré et al. (2002); Muckleston 
(s. a.), Krutilla (1967) 
2.3 Lesotho Highlands Water Project on the River Senqu-Orange: locating the 
project upstream increases aggregate net benefits 
Project description and benefit-sharing mechanism 
The earliest plans to harness the upper reaches of the River Orange-Senqu in Lesotho and 
to transport its water to South Africa were laid in the mid-1950s, when Lesotho was a 
British protectorate. Early negotiations failed over the sharing of the infrastructure costs 
and the price of delivering water. In the 1970s and 1980s, important domestic and interna-
tional political issues jeopardized the realization of the scheme (e. g. South Africa’s apart-
heid policy; territorial disputes between Lesotho and South Africa; South Africa’s reserva-
tions about dependence on a foreign state for its water supply). The political climate in 
both countries changed towards the end of the 1980s, with the RSA adopting a friendly 
regional policy and Lesotho establishing a civil government.  
The cooperation between the RSA and the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho in the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) is one of the most far-reaching examples of 
water cooperation on the African continent. The physical core of the project is formed by 
the construction of a cascade of six dams, 200 km of tunnels and associated water infra-
structure, including pumping stations and hydropower plants, on the upper reaches of the 
River Senqu (which becomes the River Orange in the RSA) on the territory of upstream 
Lesotho (a small land-locked, mountainous and water-rich kingdom). Once all three main 
phases of this multi-phase project are finalized in 2021, an expected 2,200 million cubic 
metres (MCM) of water will be transferred annually from the mountainous areas of Leso-
tho to South Africa. By 2002, only the first two phases – the construction of the two giant 
Katse (110 MW) and Mohale Dams9 and the associated tunnels and diversion weirs – had 
been completed (1998 and 2002 respectively). The water-receiving region is the RSA’s 
Gauteng Province, the country’s industrial heartland, which already has to cope with seri-
ous water shortages. The project has enabled Lesotho to reduce its heavy reliance (about 
90 per cent) on imports of South African energy by generating 2,000 GWh of hydro-
electricity annually.  
                                                 
9 The construction of the Mashai Dam (166 MW) has not yet begun. 
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The two countries concluded that water originating from Lesotho’s River Senqu which 
would otherwise flow down the River Senqu-Orange should be rerouted to South Africa’s 
Gauteng region. For this, Lesotho is compensated with electricity it generates at the new 
dams on its territory. The LHWP treaty (1986) specifies the mechanisms for sharing the 
cooperative gains from joint development. South Africa bears the full cost of transferring 
water (including the cost of construction, operation and maintenance and of social and 
environmental mitigation measures), whether incurred directly by the RSA or initially 
financed by loans to the Government of Lesotho or the Lesotho Highlands Development 
Authority (LHDA) (debt servicing and cost-related payments are met by RSA). Lesotho, 
on the other hand, bears the hydropower cost component (about five percent of total 
LHWP costs). The RSA receives water while Lesotho retains the benefits of hydroelectric-
ity production. The LHWP Treaty stipulates that South Africa shares with Lesotho, by 
means of royalty payments, the net benefit (56 per cent for Lesotho and 44 per cent for the 
RSA), “computed as the difference between the present value of the LHWP and similar 
alternative projects.” Thus the RSA pays royalties to Lesotho equivalent to 56 per cent of 
the cost savings identified by proceeding with the LHWP (Yu 2002, 52). 
Calculations of net benefits are based on the difference in the cost of two options: one pro-
ject entirely in the RSA (unilateral option), the other based on cooperation between the 
RSA and Lesotho. The latter takes advantage of gravity and of less complex civil engi-
neering than would be required to transfer the same amounts of water from the River Or-
ange within the RSA. These cost savings formed the basis for determining the royalties 
paid to Lesotho (not for water, but rather for the cost saving due to the LWHP). The royal-
ties comprise a fixed component, which is calculated on the basis of the difference in in-
vestment cost s between the LHWP and the unilateral option, the Orange-Vaal Transfer 
Scheme (OVTS), and a variable component, which reflects the differences in pumping, 
operating and maintenance costs, as compared with the OVTS.  
In this case, downstream RSA approached upstream Lesotho with the idea of constructing 
a dam. The cost would be borne by the RSA, and Lesotho would have the benefit of hy-
dropower, but it would suffer adverse environmental and social effects, for which it 
would, however, be compensated. Although the LHWP is a very special case in terms of 
water diversion, it is generally an example of case (iii) in hydro-political constellation (1), 
where the downstream state seeks to increase its net benefits by building a dam upstream. 
Benefit-sharing mechanism (C) applies where the downstream state builds a dam upstream 
to increase aggregate net benefits and meets the investment and external costs. The up-
stream state participates in the benefits of the project, and the two states share the net 
benefits of the joint project compared to the downstream state’s unilateral alternative. 
Institutional set-up 
The bilateral arrangement agreed by South Africa and Lesotho is fairly complex, compris-
ing not only financial and ownership arrangements, but also dispute settlement mecha-
nisms, a bilateral organization (the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission, LHWC) made 
up of representatives of the two governments and two autonomous implementing agen-
cies: 
(i) the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority is mandated to capture water and 
transfer it to the RSA; to generate hydropower for Lesotho; to maintain agreed rates of 
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flow; and to ensure that local communities affected will be able to maintain a standard 
of living not inferior to pre-project conditions; 
(ii) the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) in the RSA is mandated with the engi-
neering, construction, operation and maintenance and is responsible for reimbursing 
the project costs and debt service (TCTA sells water to the RSA’s Department of Wa-
ter Affairs and Forestry on the basis of full cost recovery).  
Social and environmental effects 
The social and environmental effects were mainly confined to Lesotho, where the dam 
infrastructure is located. While South Africa financed the infrastructure and pays royalties, 
it was Lesotho that incurred the environmental and social losses, but for this it received 
compensation. Revenues from the project were paid into the Lesotho Highlands Revenue 
Fund, which was suspended shortly after its launch in 1996 owing to a number of prob-
lems, including intransparent mechanisms for project-funding and investments in projects 
that were not demand-driven and thus proved ineffective. In 1997, the Lesotho Fund for 
Community Development was established to ensure employment generation and poverty 
reduction. Public participation in how the funds are used has improved, but remains a 
challenge. However, for the current phase “the key environmental and social impacts as-
sociated with the civil works of LHWP were assessed to be successfully mitigated” (Yu 
2011, 61–63).  
Lessons learnt 
The LHWP is an exceptional example of net benefits from cooperation compared with 
unilateral development, largely due to the RSA’s willingness to share the benefits of co-
operation fairly. The LHWP was made possible by the fundamental political changes 
which occurred in both countries in the late 1980s. However, the LHWP is also one of the 
most controversial transboundary water management projects because of its significant 
negative environmental impacts and its general failure to integrate local people and stake-
holders. From the early 1990s, such national and international interest groups as environ-
mental groups, human and social rights activists and church associations voiced objections 
to the project. In 1998, the LHDA and various interest groups in Lesotho signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding setting out rules for the involvement of interest groups in the 
LHWP and specifying the legal obligation of the state parties to safeguard the welfare of 
persons and communities affected. The LHWP administration and the interest groups 
agreed on Environmental Action Plans, which provided the framework for establishing 
mitigation, compensation, resettlement and development measures. This also shows that 
the project and the way it was operated continued to be disputed despite the compensation 
for negative social and environmental effects – and that monetary compensation may not 
always be perceived as equivalent to avoiding damage in the first place. 
Sources: Yu (2011); Klaphake / Scheumann (2009); Égré (2007); Égré et al. (2002) 
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2.4 Aswan High Dam (Egypt, Sudan) on the River Nile: compensating for nega-
tive externalities upstream 
Project description  
In the Nile Basin Egypt is the downstream riparian, but also militarily, politically and eco-
nomically the most powerful state in a basin of eleven riparian states since Sudan’s parti-
tion. As Egypt is traditionally dependent on the Nile for its agriculture, it has always 
sought to secure its right to the Nile waters. Claims to the River Nile were codified in a 
treaty between Egypt and Britain in 1929 and in another treaty between Egypt and Sudan 
in 1959, under which the natural inflow was shared between two, among three riparian 
countries farthest downstream. The other, upper Nile riparian countries are not signatories 
to these treaties.  
Egypt constructed the Aswan Dam in the 1960s to improve domestic flood protection and 
irrigated agriculture and to produce hydroelectric power for its post-independence indus-
trialization. The Aswan Dam created a reservoir, Lake Nasser, 550km long and 5,250 km2 
in area. Given the size of Lake Nasser, the dam led to the flooding of parts of upstream 
Sudan, where the reservoir is known as Lake Nubia. Egypt therefore agreed to compensate 
Sudan. The compensation was specified in the 1959 Agreement between the Republic of 
the Sudan and the United Arab Republic for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters. Para-
graph 6 of the Second Chapter states, that Egypt will pay Sudan 15 million Egyptian 
Pounds ‘as full compensation for the damage resulting to the Sudanese existing proper-
ties.’ The compensation agreement did not include provisions for the resettlement of the 
Nubian population in Sudan.  
The Second Chapter of the 1959 Agreement also ‘allowed’ Sudan to build the Roseires 
Dam on the Blue Nile and further river works in accordance with Sudan’s rights to the 
Nile waters (Paragraph 2). The Second Chapter further specifies a volumetric allocation of 
water to Sudan and Egypt on the basis of the augmented water supply provided by the 
Aswan reservoir, Egypt’s share being 55.5 billion cubic metres (BCM) per year, Sudan’s 
18.5 BCM, based on their ‘acquired rights’ and the ‘net yield of the Nile after the full op-
eration of the […] Reservoir’ (Paragraph 4). The Aswan High Dam made it possible to 
increase the water allocated to the two countries, compared with the allocation specified in 
the 1929 agreement between Egypt and Britain acting on behalf of Sudan. 
A benefit-sharing mechanism? 
This case corresponds to hydro-political constellation (2), a dam on a transboundary river 
with externalities upstream. However, while some compensation was provided for flood-
ing upstream and Sudan’s overall Nile allocation was increased under the agreement, it is 
unclear whether the latter can be considered to make for benefit-sharing as this paper un-
derstands it, since it is unlikely that the compensation offsets the damage suffered by Su-
dan (including the cost of resettlement) and difficult to judge whether Sudan is better off 
overall than it was before the Aswan High Dam. Furthermore, the other Nile riparian 
countries were not party to the 1959 agreement and do not accept Egypt’s and Sudan’s 
claims to the natural inflow of Nile waters into Sudan for themselves. 
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Social and environmental effects10 
The environmental impacts consisted in erosion and salinization of soils in the Nile Delta 
and water-borne diseases. As for resettlement, 100,000 to 120,000 Nubians on the Egyp-
tian and Sudanese sides of the river had to be relocated, 50,000 in Egypt and 50,000 to 
70,000 in Sudan. Scudder describes the resettlement on the Egyptian side as having pro-
ceeded in accordance with a ‘commendable but non-participatory development plan’ 
(Scudder 2003, 27). This plan provided for compensation and post-relocation development 
projects, including schools and medical facilities, agricultural land reclamation and the 
development of non-agricultural work opportunities. The Nubians were resettled as a 
group in the area around Kom Ombo, 45 km downstream from Aswan, where another 
group of Nubians had already been resettled in connection with an earlier dam.  
Yet, because the resettlement was rushed and Nubian cultural features in the areas of 
housing and family organization, for example, were neglected, the first ten years after re-
settlement proved difficult, with high death rates in the first year and a government request 
for food assistance from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food 
Programme in eight of the years between 1965 and 1975. It was only after the first decade 
that the situation improved markedly. Among other things, the people resettled were inte-
grated into the economy of the Aswan province and Nubian representatives were elected 
to local political posts.  
The resettlement programme in Sudan was planned with less consideration than in Egypt 
and included the resettlement of the Nubian population to semi-arid zones, where they had 
to cope with unfamiliar rainfall patterns and new diseases.  
Institutional set-up 
While no bilateral institutions are associated with the construction of the Aswan High 
Dam, there is a Permanent Joint Technical Committee on which both Egypt and Sudan are 
represented under the 1959 agreement.11  
Lessons learnt 
The downstream reservoir extension was covered by the 1959 bilateral agreement between 
Egypt and Sudan, which set out compensation levels and water rights based on the older 
1929 agreement. The sharing of water rights between the two countries had therefore al-
ready been established. As the sharing of water forms the basis of benefit-sharing under 
both the 1929 and the 1959 agreement, benefit-sharing does not replace water-sharing. It 
can be argued that water is shared without consideration for the upstream countries’ rights 
to Nile water. From a basin perspective, additional net benefits of cooperation might also 
be gained from moving storage capacity upstream to reduce evaporation losses and in-
crease opportunities for hydropower generation (e. g. Whittington / McClelland 1992; 
                                                 
10 This section gives a brief summary of Scudder (2003, 11–30).  
11 In 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative was launched with a view to enabling basin-wide cooperation on 
socio-economic development in the Nile River Basin. 
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Whittington et al. 2005).12 A final evaluation of the mechanism for compensating for the 
flooding in Sudan caused by the Aswan High Dam will require further research.  
Sources: Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic for 
the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters; Scudder (2003) 
2.5 Kariba Dam on the River Zambezi (Zambia, Zimbabwe) and notes on the 
Itaipu Dam on the Río Paraná (Brazil, Paraguay): symmetrical benefits of a 
dam on a border river 
Project description and benefit-sharing mechanism 
The Zambezi River Basin is one of the largest transboundary basins in Africa. It stretches 
across the territory of eight states, namely Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, Zim-
babwe, Malawi, Tanzania and Mozambique. Cooperation began in the early 1950s, when 
the then Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) were under 
colonial rule and united in a federation with Nyasaland (Malawi). The Federation engaged 
in a hydropower project because “the copper mines of Zambia were experiencing electric 
power shortages and there was an urgent need for a large dependable source of cheap 
electric power. In addition, the fast developing industrial, agricultural and mining sectors 
of Southern Rhodesia were also suffering from a shortage of electric power” (WCD 
2000b, 133). 
The key element of the project infrastructure is the Kariba Dam, which was built between 
1953 and 1963 along a 760 km strip where the river now forms the border between Zam-
bia and Zimbabwe. The dam has an active storage capacity of 186 BCM and two power 
stations with an installed capacity of 1,266 MW (600 MW in Zambia, 666 MW in Zim-
babwe), which provide 34 per cent of the total electricity consumed in the two countries. 
When the Federation ended in 1963, with Zambia gaining its independence in 1964 and 
Zimbabwe following in 1980, cooperation became an international issue in the true sense 
of the word. At that time, the project had yet to be completed, and the states had to negoti-
ate on dam-operating procedures. In November 1963, Northern and Southern Rhodesia 
established the Central African Power Corporation (CAPCO) to complete the construction 
work and operate the system, including electricity generation and transmission. A Higher 
Authority for Power comprising two ministers from each country would control and coor-
dinate CAPCO’s activities. CAPCO was abolished in 1987, and the Zambezi River Au-
thority (ZRA) was established in the same year. The change occurred because Zambia 
thought that CAPCO favoured Zimbabwe (Scudder 2005, 7).  
The Kariba Dam is owned equally by the Governments of Zambia and Zimbabwe, its 
benefits and liabilities similarly being shared equally. It is operated by the ZRA. 
                                                 
12 In 2011, Ethiopia laid the foundation stone for a more than 5000 megawatts hydropower dam close to 
the Sudanese border, the so called Millennium or Grand Renaissance dam. In January 2012, a first meet-
ing of an Ethiopian-Sudanese-Egyptian tripartite committee dealing with the dam’s cross-border effects 
took place (http://grandmillenniumdam.net, accessed 26 March 2012).  
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The Kariba case thus falls into hydro-political constellation (4), a dam on a border river 
with benefit-sharing mechanism (A), where the cost of joint infrastructure is borne in pro-
portion to benefits received. 
Institutional set-up 
The ZRA is a corporate body under parallel legislation enacted by the parliaments of 
Zambia and Zimbabwe “for the economic, industrial and social development of the two 
countries, the greatest possible benefit from the natural advantages offered by the waters 
of the Zambezi River and to improve and intensify the utilization of the waters for the 
production of energy and for any other purpose beneficial to the two countries” (ZRA 
1987). 
Hydropower generation and the transmission system have been designed to operate as a 
single entity with two national power stations. The system in each country supports the 
other to preclude blackouts and to stabilize voltage outputs and frequency. In addition, 
hydropower is generated at the Kariba Dam in conjunction with the thermal power stations 
in Zimbabwe and the Kafue Gorge power station in Zambia (Tumbare 2002).  
The ZRA has a four-level policy and management structure comprising a Council of Min-
isters, a Board of Directors, a Chief Executive and three departments for operational func-
tions. The ZRA’s mandate is to maintain the dam’s water level and to allocate water to the 
two national power utilities, the Kariba North Bank Company (Zambia) and the Zim-
babwe Electricity Supply Authority. It finances its activities from the sale of water to the 
power utilities; revenues from these sales are typically in the order of US$10 million an-
nually. 
Social and environmental effects 
“The pre-project planning document (1951) estimated the number of people to be re-
settled at 29,000. In the Kariba project document of 1955, there is little detail on the 
resettlement programme, except for a budget allocation of £4 million that was to be 
spent. (...) Later, a decision was made that each of the governments in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe would have responsibility for managing resettlement in their country. This 
decision meant that the resettlement programme was removed from the main project. 
The actual number of people to be resettled increased from 29,000 to 57,000. The 
budget for resettlement remained unchanged” (WCD 2000b). 
The Kariba Dam flooded the Zambezi valley upstream where the Tonga people lived on 
both sides of the river. They were to be resettled far away from the reservoir area where 
“they had to build from scratch, clearing the bush and constructing huts. The people of 
the north and south banks were cut off completely from each other. … Many also lost 
highly productive alluvial fields on the edge of the Zambezi and had to take to dry land 
farming in the rugged foothills of the escarpment” (Tremmel et al. 1995), in areas with 
poor soil for farming and limited access to water. While an international rescue activity 
(Operation Noah) took care of endangered species, the 50,700 Tonga found neither na-
tional nor international support.  
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Lessons learned 
With regard to electricity demand in Zambia and Zimbabwe, interests are symmetrical, 
which contributed to the realization of the project. However, interests were not always in 
harmony. In the early planning stage, Northern Rhodesia favoured a project on its territory 
(the Kafue tributary), while Southern Rhodesia opted for the location subsequently cho-
sen, Kariba, where the river forms the border between the two countries. To settle the 
Kariba-Kafue debate, the Federal government appointed a neutral party in 1953 to assess 
the two projects objectively. The Coyne report of December 1954 convinced the Federal 
government that the Kariba project should have preference over Kafue (WCD 2000b, 11).  
The creation of the Kariba project therefore became possible because the Federal govern-
ment overruled Northern Rhodesia. Cooperation between Zambia and Zimbabwe, already 
unsatisfactory under the Federal government, remained difficult, leading Zambia to press 
for the abolition of CAPCO and the creation of an alternative organization (ZRA) that had 
less executive power and was more closely supervised by the two governments. 
The 1987 ZRA arrangement can be considered a relative success in terms of benefit-
sharing at international level. It shows that benefit-sharing may be easier in border river 
arrangements with symmetrical interests than in a transboundary setting. However, dis-
tributing costs and benefits in a way perceived to be equitable by the various parties may 
still pose challenges. The project also came at the expense of the local population, which 
had to be resettled. 
Box 1: Notes on the Itaipu Dam, Río Paraná 
The Itaipu power station has an installed capacity of 14,000 MW and produces almost 100 percent of 
Paraguay’s electricity and 25 percent of Brazil’s. The dam and power station are located on the Río Para-
ná where it forms the border between Brazil and Paraguay. Feasibility studies on the hydroelectric poten-
tial of the Río Paraná had already been carried out in the 1940s and, after lengthy negotiations, they re-
sulted in the Act of Iguaçu (1966). In this, the two countries agreed that “the power produced would be 
equally divided (…), each being granted the preferential right to acquire, at fair prices, any quantity of 
power not utilized by the other for its own consumption”. The Itaipu Treaty of 1973 established Itaipu 
Binacional (jointly owned by ELETROBRAS (Brazil) and the Administración Nacional de Electricidad 
(Paraguay)), which built, owns and operates the facility. The treaty requires Itaipu Binacional to pay roy-
alties to both governments, in equal portions, for the exploitation of the resources.  
This case is also exceptional in that Brazilian law – following the new Constitution of 1988 – stipulates 
that, throughout the life of the infrastructure, 45 per cent of the royalties received by Brazil from Itaipu 
Binacional are to be shared with the municipalities affected by the project. 
Sources: on the Kariba Dam: Klaphake / Scheumann (2009); Tumbare (2002); WCD (2000b); ZRA (1987); 
on the Itaipu Dam: Égré et al. (2002, 35–36); Égré (2007, 22–27); Scudder (2005) 
2.6 Summary of the cases  
Table 3 summarizes the cases presented in sections 2.1 to 2.5, showing their hydro-
political constellations, incentive structures and benefit-sharing mechanisms. As discussed 
above, with the exception of the LHWP, the initial benefit-sharing mechanisms described 
in Table 3 did not take negative social and environmental effects adequately into account.  
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3 Factors influencing benefit-sharing 
3.1 Political and institutional factors 
A number of factors play a role in whether benefit-sharing schemes materialize. As Phil-
lips et al. (2006) aptly argue, the realization of benefit-sharing depends on the political 
environment in the basin. From our case studies we can identify the following intervening 
variables. 
Table 3: Overview of cases 
River / project Hydro-political  
constellation and dam 
purposes 
Incentive structure Benefit-sharing  
mechanism  
Manantali and 
Diama Dams on 
River Senegal 
(Senegal, Mali, 
Mauritania,  
Guinea) 
(1) and (2): Upstream 
and downstream dams on 
transboundary river: 
hydropower, navigation, 
irrigation and flood con-
trol 
(i) financial con-
straints on all riparans 
– project rational only 
collectively 
(ii) Senegal and Mau-
ritania lack appropri-
ate dam sites for 
hydropower  
(A): Sharing of cost of jointly owned 
infrastructure in proportion to ex-
pected irrigation, navigation and 
hydropower benefits; 
OMVS attracts funding sources 
Canadian dams on 
Columbia River 
(Canada, USA) 
(1) upstream dams on 
transboundary river: 
hydropower and flood 
control 
(ii) flood control 
benefits to USA; 
electricity gain for 
Canada 
(B) increase in aggregate net benefits 
through altered dam design up-
stream: Canada builds dams for 
downstream flood control and up-
stream hydropower generation; USA 
compensates Canada for investment 
costs by paying half of the value of 
downstream flood protection and 
electricity generation  
LWHP on River 
Senqu-Orange 
(Lesotho, South 
Africa) 
(1) upstream dams on 
transboundary river: 
hydropower and water 
supply 
(iii) increased water 
supply for South 
Africa; electricity 
gain for Lesotho  
(C) South Africa pays investment 
and operating costs and external 
costs of storage and transfer of water 
from Lesotho; Lesotho receives in-
kind hydropower benefits; net bene-
fits of cooperation compared to uni-
lateral action are shared (royalties) 
Aswan High Dam 
on Nile River 
(Egypt, Sudan) 
(2) downstream dam on 
transboundary river: 
hydropower and irriga-
tion 
negative externality 
upstream  
none, but compensation  
Kariba Dam on Ri-
ver Zambezi 
(Zambia, 
Zimbabwe) 
Itaipu Dam on Río 
Paraná (Brazil,  
Paraguay) 
(4) dam on border river: 
hydropower 
symmetrical benefits 
and externalities 
(A) joint investment, benefit alloca-
tion according to investment shares 
Source: authors’ own compilation 
Benefit-sharing in dam projects on shared rivers 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 27 
3.1.1 Foreign policies of relevant basin states 
Cooperative foreign policies are likely to increase the willingness of basin countries to 
negotiate on the use of shared water resources, since states that cooperate have established 
channels of communication and platforms for acting together on a wide variety of issues. 
Incompatible foreign policies are likely to prevent cooperation, given the lack of mutual 
trust (see also LeMarquand 1977 and Frey 1993). The Columbia River Basin is a prime 
example, Canada’s and the United States’ cooperative policies reaching back into the 18th 
century (see also section 3.1.2 below). Vaz and van der Zaag (s. a.) have found that coop-
eration in the Incomati basin (not included in this study) increased as South Africa shifted 
its regional foreign policy from conflict to cooperation. 
 
3.1.2 A history of cooperation between basin states and of institutionalized 
cooperation in the basin 
The literature argues that, in river basins with a history of cooperation and institutions to 
build on, cooperation in new areas can be achieved more easily than in basins where no 
institutions exist (Wolf 2004), since existing mechanisms can be used to exchange infor-
mation and build mutual confidence, which reduces transaction costs. However, it should 
be noted that in many river basins it took a long time for cooperation to emerge.  
The countries adjoining the River Senegal had concluded multilateral agreements since the 
1963 Bamako Convention, when the river was accorded international status. The aim was 
the economic exploitation of the river, which had first been attempted by the French colo-
nialists. The 1963 agreement provided the basis for the 1972 OMVS agreement. By 1972, 
however, Guinea, a signatory to the Bamako Convention, had decided not to continue par-
ticipating in the multilateral effort and did not return to the OMVS until 2005. It should 
also be mentioned that the history of cooperation did not prevent Senegal and Mauritania 
from engaging in a border war from 1989 to 1991: an attempt by an alliance of domestic 
actors in Mauritania to profit from the increase in land prices due to the irrigation project 
led directly to the conflict with Senegal (Kipping 2005).  
By the time the Columbia River Treaty was concluded in 1961, negotiations on the trans-
boundary rivers between the United States and Canada had been ongoing for roughly 200 
years. The first agreement was signed in 1783, when the two countries laid down naviga-
tional rights for their citizens. Several other agreements followed, laying the foundations 
for the Columbia River Treaty. The history of cooperation is also testimony to the political 
will of both countries to resolve disputes peacefully.  
Bilateral cooperation on the Kariba Dam began in the 1950s during the colonial period. 
Disagreements notwithstanding, the post-colonial states of Zambia and Zimbabwe were 
therefore in a relatively good position to continue negotiations on the basis of the colonial 
plans.  
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3.1.3 The nature of domestic administrative systems and power structures 
The nature of domestic political institutions, that is, the relationship between state and 
society, determines decision-making processes (e. g. Le Marquand 1977). For example, in 
states where environmental non-governmental organizations are able to influence the deci-
sion-making process, policies may be more environmentally sensitive than in authoritarian 
countries, where governments may pursue an agenda of fast GDP growth, with less scope 
for opposition. Domestic decision-making processes in democratic states can be influ-
enced by a host of stakeholders, including local governments, ministerial bureaucracies, 
political parties and such non-state actors as businesses, non-governmental organizations 
and policy entrepreneurs. The relative powers and capacities of these actors and the policy 
networks they form have a bearing on policies at national level. As mentioned above, in-
ternational cooperation may therefore be described as a two-level game (Putnam 1988), in 
which the ratification of international agreements hinges on endorsement at national level. 
If the communities directly affected have a voice and influence in decision-making at na-
tional level, international benefit-sharing projects on international rivers may be influ-
enced by domestic actors’ concerns about social and environmental issues.  
For instance, Canada’s federal system accords the provinces sovereign rights over the 
natural resources in their territories. Legislation allocates the provinces considerable deci-
sion-making power vis-à-vis the federal government. During the negotiations with the 
United States on the Columbia River Treaty, Canada therefore underwent a complex proc-
ess of internal negotiation to find a common position from which to negotiate with the 
United States. This notwithstanding, the voices of local communities were only heard and 
a local benefit-sharing mechanism established more than 30 years after initial agreement 
has been concluded. In the case of the LHWP, the institutional set-up and the mechanism 
for compensating for social and environmental damage/effects were revised under domes-
tic and international pressure, but remain controversial. 
3.1.4 National water policies and preferences 
National water policies, which reflect domestic policy discourses and preferences, also 
have a bearing on interstate cooperation (e. g. Waterbury 1997). Whether countries have 
adopted the concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), how efficiently 
countries use their water resources or whether they have a preference for expanding irri-
gated agriculture determines their interests in the economic use of a river and the potential 
for conflict and cooperation with other basin states. National development objectives also 
determine dam functions (multi- or single-purpose) and design. 
The complex Clé de Répartition between Mali, Mauritania and Senegal was the result of a 
compromise based on different national water-use preferences and policies. The United 
States’ interest in protecting its hydropower production from floods and upstream Can-
ada’s plans also to produce hydropower led to the benefit-sharing mechanism in the Co-
lumbia River Treaty. The LHWP came about because of South Africa’s perceived need to 
increase the supply of water to the Gauteng region.  
If national policies opt for dams generating hydro-electricity, the potential for cooperation 
and for establishing benefit-sharing arrangements is high when compared with other dam-
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related purposes (irrigation). If, on the other hand, countries achieve high water-use effi-
ciency internally, they may see less need for international cooperation (Waterbury 1997).  
3.1.5 Third parties  
Bi- and multilateral donors and private enterprises may play an important role in the for-
mulation of benefit-sharing mechanisms, because they provide funding and technical 
knowledge and can act as neutral intermediaries (Mostert 2005).  
In the Senegal case, 16 donors supported the establishment of the OMVS, and several of 
them backed the creation of the Regional Hydropower Development Project, which miti-
gated environmental effects and helped to revive energy production at the Manantali Dam. 
However, the OMVS needed continued donor support to ensure sustained funding, the 
disadvantage of donor support thus being that organizations may come to rely on it.  
Where a number of donors are involved, it will also be necessary to coordinate individual 
funding projects. If donors operate in the same river basin or sub-basin, the joint creation 
of benefit-sharing mechanisms can preclude the financing of rival projects or the duplica-
tion of funding.  
3.1.6 Regional initiatives  
Regional initiatives that extend beyond dam construction may be important for the estab-
lishment of benefit-sharing mechanisms. Where regional cooperation projects or wider 
regional economic integration frameworks (such as the SADC) exist, they can serve as a 
platform for the exchange of information and the building of mutual confidence and so 
reduce transaction costs (e. g. Durth 1996). Benefit-sharing mechanisms on shared rivers 
can therefore build on existing regional cooperation projects or on regional institutions.  
What is particularly important in the SADC’s case is that the revised SADC Protocol on 
Shared Watercourse Systems (2000) requires the member states to consult on the construc-
tion of water infrastructure. Additional SADC guidelines exist in the form of the Regional 
Water Policy, the Regional Water Strategy and the Regional Indicative Strategic Devel-
opment Plan. Benefit-sharing in the SADC region therefore has the major advantage of a 
politically conducive environment and the accepted concept of regional development 
(SADC s. a., 2). 
3.1.7 Power relations between riparian states 
Power relations between riparian countries can play an important role in fostering or hin-
dering cooperation. It can generally be assumed that symmetrical power relations are more 
conducive to cooperation and benefit-sharing than asymmetrical relations. In a large N 
study, Song and Whittington (2004) find that riparian countries with equal economic and 
political strength are far more likely to have negotiated treaties than other riparian coun-
tries.  
Oliver Hensengerth / Ines Dombrowsky / Waltina Scheumann 
30 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
In the case of the River Senegal, all three states had reached similar levels of economic 
development and therefore faced a similar development need to move from an agriculture-
based to a more advanced industrialized economy. In the case of the Columbia River ba-
sin, benefit-sharing similarly profited from fairly symmetrical power relations.  
On the other hand, asymmetrical power relations among riparian states may impede the 
application of benefit-sharing mechanisms, because the more powerful state lacks the in-
centive to cooperate (Zeitoun / Jägerskog 2011) even if net benefits would increase 
through cooperation. In the case of the Nile, for instance, Egypt decided in the 1950s to 
build a major dam on its own territory (the Aswan High Dam) in order to maintain full 
control over the project, even though it knew of the benefits of a transboundary approach 
that would have involved dam projects in Ethiopia (Waterbury 1979).  
3.2 Processes: application of benefit-sharing during or after dam-building  
negotiations 
In process terms, a benefit-sharing mechanism can be negotiated during the planning and 
construction phase or after the dam has been commissioned. In the latter case, the imple-
mentation of environmental management plans may be included to compensate for envi-
ronmental effects not taken into account in the original planning of the dam; adjustments 
may be made to the operation of the dam in order to release additional water for the bene-
fit of downstream agriculture; or electricity and water volumes may be reallocated to even 
out perceived imbalances in the distribution of benefits when the original agreements were 
concluded. 
An example of this is the hydropower-generating Kariba Dam on the River Zambezi, 
planned during the CAPCO mandate. Zambia believed the dam was producing more bene-
fits for Zimbabwe, and the dispute led to CAPCO’s dissolution in 1985, the establishment 
of the Zambezi River Authority in 1987 and finally to a 50:50 allocation of costs and 
benefits (Mokorosi 2007).  
Another example is the River Senegal project, where the riparian states changed the opera-
tion of the dam to create artificial flooding for more traditional agricultural production. In 
2002 the riparians also signed a Water Charter to institutionalize environmental protection 
mechanisms in the OMVS.  
In other projects, benefit-sharing applies right from the planning and construction phases. 
This is true, for example, of projects in which countries share the financial burden of plan-
ning and constructing the dam and then such beneficial outcomes as hydropower, irriga-
tion water or flood control. Among the many projects of this kind are the Lesotho High-
lands Water Project, the River Senegal and the Columbia River Treaty.  
3.3 Net benefits: full accounting of social and environmental costs  
One of the arguments advanced in the debate on dams is that, in too many cases, only a 
small segment of society benefits, while people living near the site of a dam have to en-
dure its negative impacts: the flood control achieved with a dam may benefit those living 
downstream, while the assets of those living in or near the area reserved for the reservoir 
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disappear beneath the water; reservoirs store water for irrigation to the benefit of a group 
of people downstream, but at a high cost for those living in the reservoir area; power gen-
eration benefits urban centres and industry, sometimes at some distance from the dam site, 
but not necessarily those living nearby; and people living close to the reservoir may also 
have to endure such adverse environmental or health effects as eutrophication of a reser-
voir and waterborne diseases.  
This list is not exhaustive, but it indicates that those subject to involuntary resettlement 
have a heavy burden to bear. The estimated number of people involuntarily resettled from 
dam sites worldwide is far from insignificant, ranging between 40 and 80 million (WCD 
2000a, 11), many of whom have yet to be fully compensated for their losses.  
Basic requirements for the construction of socially and environmentally friendly dams are 
recommended, for example, by the World Commission on Dams (WCD 2000a) and the 
Safeguard Policies of the World Bank (2001), which address involuntary resettlement 
practices and environmental planning and management. Both policies call not only for 
compensation for the loss of land and other property but also for the creation of new in-
come-generating opportunities, for the restoration of the livelihoods of the populace af-
fected (Pearce 1999) and for the costs of environmental management plans to be covered. 
To prevent benefits from being shared between states at the expense of those who live 
near a dam, the mitigation of the adverse effects of a dam project on a transboundary or 
border river is a cost component which should be taken fully into account when net bene-
fits are calculated.  
There are monetary and non-monetary mechanisms that do more than compensate for en-
vironmental and economic losses. They are means of sharing some of the benefits gained 
from dam operation (Égré et al. 2002, 2) with all those affected – to varying degrees – by 
the project. Funds for local or regional development, for instance, are derived from the 
revenue stream of the project when in operation (Haas 2009).  
The World Bank (Égré et al. 2002) and the UNEP Dams and Development Project (2007) 
reviewed compensation options in dam projects on international, transboundary and na-
tional rivers and identified a number of monetary and non-monetary mechanisms:  
— Redistributing some of the dam revenues to local/regional authorities in the form of 
royalties tied to power generation or water charges; 
— Establishing development funds financed from power sales to provide, for example, 
seed money for economic development in the project-affected area; 
— Part or full ownership of the project by project-affected people who share profits (and 
risks); 
— Levying property taxes on dam owners (e. g. hydropower corporations) or on a dam’s 
property value (taxes are not related to revenues generated, but are a fixed charge) 
which are then transferred to local authorities, communities affected or river basin au-
thorities; 
— Granting preferential electricity rates and subsidized irrigation water to local compa-
nies and project-affected populations; 
— Allocating fishing rights to resettlers in the newly created reservoir and hiring project-
affected people for construction works (Égré et al. 2002, 3). 
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A prominent example is the regulation in Brazil: Brazilian law stipulates that States and 
municipalities affected must receive a percentage of the royalties from Itaipu Binacional, 
the owner and operator of the Itaipu Dam on the Río Paraná. In Paraguay, on the other 
hand, 100 percent of the royalties are paid into the national treasury, which then decides 
on their redistribution. In Canada the Columbia Basin Trust, which represents 170,000 
residents of the Columbia Basin, receives a share of the revenue from hydroelectricity 
generation which the USA pays in exchange for the prevention of flooding downstream 
achieved with the help of the dam on Canadian territory. If really and effectively imple-
mented, such schemes have the potential to increase the domestic acceptability of dam 
projects on shared rivers and so to alleviate any negative effects of applying interstate 
benefit-sharing mechanisms.  
4 Conclusions and recommendations for development cooperation 
This study has explored incentive structures and mechanisms for sharing the benefits of 
dams on shared rivers. It posits that the opportunities for deriving benefits from coopera-
tion depend on the alignment of hydrological and political boundaries and the location of 
the dam in relation to them (‘hydro-political constellations’) and on the aims and external 
effects of each dam. It has been argued that it is rational for riparians to cooperate if each 
is able to generate higher aggregate net benefits than it would attain without cooperation. 
In doing so negative social and environmental effects should be fully taken into account 
and compensated. Cases identified in this study in which the benefits of cooperating on 
dams have been shared include the dams on the River Senegal, the Canadian dams on the 
Columbia River, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project on the River Orange-Senqu, the 
Kariba Dam on the River Zambezi and the Itaipu Dam on the Río Paraná. These cases 
represent the following four incentive structures for cooperation on dams on shared rivers:  
— cooperation enables economic or financial constraints on unilateral action to be over-
come (River Senegal),  
— an altered dam design upstream increases net aggregate benefits (Columbia River),  
— locating a dam upstream increases aggregate net benefits (River Orange-Senqu),  
— a joint dam on a border river enables mutual benefits to be achieved (River Zambezi, 
Río Paraná).  
The case studies also represent three different types of benefit-sharing mechanisms: (A) 
costs are shared in relation to benefits in the case of jointly owned dams (River Senegal, 
River Zambezi, Río Paraná); (B) the party altering its unilateral dam design is compen-
sated for losses incurred as a result of this alteration, and net benefits of cooperation are 
shared (Columbia River); and (C) the downstream state convinces the upstream state to 
build a dam, covers the cost and shares the net benefits of the dam (River Orange-Senqu). 
Benefit-sharing seems to be particularly straightforward where the riparians decide to co-
own the infrastructure involved from the outset. The costs are then shared in proportion to 
benefits (Type A). Interestingly, this happens not only on border rivers, the River Senegal 
being an example where it has occurred on a transboundary river. 
While benefits have been shared in these cases, it is also evident that, in many cases, the 
environmental and social impacts on the population affected by dams were not taken into 
account from the outset, and projects had to be renegotiated at a later stage. It should be 
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pointed out that some of the projects concerned were negotiated several decades ago and, 
to our knowledge, they were not conceived as ‘benefit-sharing’ projects. Furthermore, 
even if benefits of cooperation can be identified and cooperation therefore appears rational 
for all riparians, a number of factors in the political and institutional environment influ-
ence the application of a benefit-sharing approach to dams.  
The study has also failed to find any evidence of benefit-sharing where negative external-
ities occur upstream. In the case of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile, the downstream 
riparian, Egypt, provided some compensation for resettlement in Sudan upstream, but it is 
questionable whether this can be described as benefit-sharing.  
From a scientific point of view, the typology developed should be tested further in addi-
tional case studies. Some of the cases studied would also merit more in-depth research to 
answer a number of open questions concerning the benefit-sharing and compensation 
mechanisms used (e. g. the Nile and Columbia cases). 
On the basis of these findings, donors may support the application of benefit-sharing 
schemes if they remember that the precise opportunities and incentives for benefit-sharing 
in the construction of dams on shared rivers depend on the particular interests of the par-
ties involved and on the opportunities presented by the given hydro-political setting. Our 
recommendations are as follows. 
Recommendation 1 
If the potential inherent in river dams for economic and social gains and for mitigation and 
adaptation in relation to climate change is to be exploited, benefit-sharing at international 
level should become a prioritization criterion for donors in their decisions on whether or 
not to support such projects. Benefit-sharing is an approach to precluding upstream-
downstream conflicts on a shared river, and it is in line with the principles of international 
water law.  
Recommendation 2 
Donors should seize windows of opportunity and help riparian countries to identify bene-
fit-sharing potential (that is, explore project options; define baskets of benefits for multi-
purpose dams; support cost-benefit analysis) and appropriate mechanisms. Ideally, this 
would be done in a quantitative manner, but a useful first step might be to analyse certain 
benefit streams in a qualitative way, since monetizing some of the benefits may be very 
difficult.  
Recommendation 3 
Donors should help relevant actors with capacity development and enable them to develop 
and implement benefit-sharing mechanisms; these actors are a diverse group, comprising, 
for example, national water and energy administrations, river basin organizations, regional 
economic organizations and power utilities. 
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Recommendation 4 
Donor financing of regional benefit-sharing mechanisms should be provided only if social 
and environmental costs are fully compensated for and taken into account in calculating 
net benefits. Donors should also ensure that riparian countries contribute towards infra-
structure development. The cost components of adequate resettlement planning, environ-
mental management and cultural heritage plans should be calculated on the basis of inter-
national standards and impact assessment studies (environmental, social), which should be 
applied in a transboundary context (see UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) and the UNECE Convention 
on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention)).  
Recommendation 5 
Donors should support the re-negotiation of benefit-sharing at existing dams if requested 
to do so by the parties concerned. 
Aside from these specific recommendations, which concern the examination and imple-
mentation of benefit-sharing schemes, there are others relating to support for the develop-
ment of an environment conducive to benefit-sharing. The rationale is that benefit-sharing 
is not merely a technical and rational economic process. Political factors, such as national 
foreign policy preferences, domestic administrative systems and power structures and na-
tional water policies, are likely to play a part in negotiations on benefit-sharing schemes.  
Recommendation 6 
Donors should support the adoption/ratification of international agreements and regional 
water treaties by the riparian countries concerned in order to promote transboundary water 
cooperation. International water treaties (such as the 1997 Convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses) or regional treaties (such as the 
2000 SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses and the Helsinki Convention, 1992) lay 
down general principles for equitable and reasonable utilization and the avoidance of sig-
nificant harm on shared rivers and thus provide guidance on the cooperative use of shared 
rivers. 
Recommendation 7 
Donors should support the reform of national water policies with a view to the adoption of 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) principles. National water policies that 
are in line with IWRM and promote the efficient, environmentally sustainable and socially 
acceptable use of water resources are likely to be more conducive to the cooperative use of 
those resources at transboundary level. 
Recommendation 8 
Donors might support regional initiatives extending beyond water, since they can serve as 
platforms for the exchange of information and the harmonization of national development 
objectives. Embedding planning in a regional initiative also enables existing cooperation 
mechanisms to be used and ensures that the planning of a dam is linked directly to other 
regional initiatives (such as the promotion of the interconnection of hydropower systems). 
Benefit-sharing in dam projects on shared rivers 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 35 
Bibliography 
AfDB (African Development Bank) (1988): Diama Dam Project: project performance evaluation report, s. l. 
Africa Recovery (2004): 17 (4), online: http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol17no4/174 ag.htm 
(accessed 2 Aug. 2011) 
Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic for the Full Utilization of the 
Nile Waters of 1959 (1998): in: W. Scheumann / M. Schiffler (eds.), Water in the Middle East: potential 
for conflicts and prospects for cooperation, Berlin: Springer, 186–190  
Alam, U. / O. Dione / P. Jeffrey (2009): The benefit-sharing principle: implementing sovereignty bargains on 
water, in: Political Geography 28, 90–100 
Ayibotele, N. B. (s. a.): Senegal: establishing a transboundary organisation for IWRM in the Senegal River 
Basin  
Biswas, A. K. (1999): Management of international waters: opportunities and constraints, in: International 
Journal of Water Resources Management 15 (4), 429–441 
BMZ (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) (2011): Konzeptpapier des 
BMZ zur Profilierung „Grenzüberschreitendes Wasserressourcenmanagement (GWM) in Afrika“, 
Bonn 
Chanudet, V. et al. (2011): Gross CO2 and CH4 emissions from the Nam Ngum and Nam Leuk sub-tropical 
reservoirs in Lao PDR, in: Science of the total Environment 409 (24), 5382–5391 
Collaborative Programme of ADB, FAO, IFAD, IWMI and the World Bank (2007): Investment in agricultur-
al water for poverty reduction and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, synthesis report; online: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/RPDLPROGRAM/Resources/459596–1170984095733/syn 
thesisreport.pdf (accessed 2 Aug. 2011) 
Columbia River Treaty (1991): online: http://www.ccrh.org/comm/river/docs/cotreaty.htm (accessed 2 Aug. 
2011) 
Dinar, S. (2006): Assessing side-payments and cost-sharing patterns in international water agreements: the 
geographic and economic connection, in: Political Geography 25 (4), 412–437 
Dombrowsky, I. (2007): Conflict, cooperation and institutions in international water management. An eco-
nomic analysis, Cheltenham/UK, Northampton/Mass./USA: Edward Elgar 
– (2009): Revisiting the potential for benefit sharing in the management of trans-boundary rivers, in: Water 
Policy 11 (2), 125–140  
– (2010a): The role of intra-water sector issue linkage in the resolution of transboundary water conflicts, in: 
Water International 35 (2), 132–149 
– (2010b): Benefit sharing in transboundary water management through intra-water sector issue linkage?, in: 
J. Lundqvist (ed.), On the water front: selections from the 2009 World Water Week in Stockholm, 
Stockholm: Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI), 25–31 
Durth, R. (1996): Grenzüberschreitende Umweltprobleme und regionale Integration. Zur Politischen Öko-
nomie von Oberlauf-Unterlauf-Problemen an internationalen Flüssen, Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Égré, D. (2007): UNEP dams and development project: compendium on relevant practices, 2nd stage, re-
vised final report, benefit sharing issue, s. l.: UNEP 
Égré, D. / V. Roquet / C. Durocher (2002): Benefit sharing from dam projects, phase 1: desk study, final 
report, Washington, DC: World Bank 
Environmental Resources Management (2007): Environmental and social impact assessment of the Bui 
Hydropower Project, final report, Accra: Environmental Resources Management 
Fearnside, P. M. (2004): Greenhouse gas emissions from hydroelectric dams: controversies provide a 
springboard for rethinking a supposedly “clean” energy source, in: Climatic Change 66 (1–2), 1–8 
Fink, M. (2005): Integrating the World Commission on Dams recommendations in large dam planning pro-
cesses: the case of Bui, Ghana, Dortmund: mimeo 
Frey, F. W. (1993): The political context of conflict and cooperation over international river basins, in: Wa-
ter International 18, 54–68 
Garrod, G. / K. Willis (1999): Economic valuation of the environment: methods and case studies, Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar 
Oliver Hensengerth / Ines Dombrowsky / Waltina Scheumann 
36 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Giordano, M. A. / A. T. Wolf (2003): Transboundary freshwater treaties, in: M. Nakayama (ed.), Internation-
al waters in Southern Africa, New York: United Nations University Press, 71–100  
Haas, L. (2009): Introducing benefit sharing around large dams in West Africa: drawing on regional and 
international experience, s. l.: Global Water Initiative and International Institute for Environment and 
Development  
Heinlein, P. (2011): Ethiopia offers olive branch in Nile water sharing dispute, in: Voice of America 31 
March 2011 
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2010): World Energy Outlook 2010, Paris; online: http://www.giga 
book.org/viewnews-273273.html (accessed 4 April 2012) 
– (2011): World Energy Outlook 2011, Paris 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2008): Climate change and water, technical paper, B. 
Bates et al., Geneva: IPCC Secretariat 
KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) (s. a.): Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal: Stau-
damm Manantali, Ex Post-Evaluierungsbericht  
Kipping, M. (2005): Wasserkonflikte und Wasserkooperation am Senegalfluss, in: M. Kipping / S. Linde-
mann, Konflikte und Kooperation um Wasser: Wasserpolitik am Senegalfluss und internationales 
Flussmanagement im Südlichen Afrika, Münster: Lit, 22–107 
Kirschke, S. (2010): Grenzüberschreitendes Flussgebietsmanagement: die Rolle von Benefit Sharing-
Mechanismen im Rahmen der Senegalkooperation  
Klaphake, A. (2005): Kooperation an internationalen Flüssen aus ökonomischer Perspektive: das Konzept 
des Benefit Sharing, Bonn: DIE (Discussion Paper 6/2005) 
– / W. Scheumann (2009): Understanding transboundary water cooperation: evidence from sub-Sahara Afri-
ca, in: L. Swatuk / L. Wirkus (eds.), Transboundary water governance in Southern Africa. Exploring 
underexplored dimensions, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 47–72 
Krutilla, J. V. (1967): The Columbia River treaty: the economics of an international river basin develop-
ment, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 
LeMarquand, D. G. (1977): International rivers. The politics of cooperation, Vancouver: Westwater Re-
search Center, University of British Columbia 
Mäler, K.-G. (1990): International environmental problems, in: Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6 (1), 
80–107 
Malzbender, D. (s. a.): The implementation of benefit sharing arrangements in SADC: the case of the 
Incomati River Basin, African Centre for Water Research (on file with authors) 
Mas-Colell, A. / M. D. Whinston et al. (1995): Microeconomic theory, New York: Oxford University Press 
McCartney, M. (2009): Living with dams: managing the environmental impacts, in: Water Policy 11, sup-
plement 1, 121–139 
Mokorosi, P. S. (2007): Can benefits be shared equitably among a variety of stakeholders in a transboundary 
river basin?, Learning from Zambezi and Orange-Senqu basins. Paper prepared for the 8th 
WaterNet/WARFSA/GWP-SA Symposium, Livingstone, Zambia 
Mostert, E. (2005): How can international donors promote transboundary water management?, Bonn: DIE 
(Discussion Paper 8/2005)  
Muckleston, K. W. (s. a.): International management in the Columbia River Basin, s. l.: UNESCO 
Pearce, D. W. (1999): Methodological issues in the economic analysis for involuntary resettlement opera-
tions, in: M. Cernea (ed.), The economics of involuntary resettlement, Questions and challenges, Wash-
ington, DC: World Bank, 50–82 
Phillips, D. et al. (2006): Transboundary water cooperation as a tool for conflict prevention and broader 
benefit-sharing, Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Putnam, R. D. (1988): Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games, in: International 
Organization 42 (3), 427–460 
Qaddumi, H. (2008): Practical approaches to transboundary water benefit-sharing, London: Overseas Devel-
opment Institute (Working Paper 292) 
Rogers, P. / R. de Silva et al. (2002): Water is an economic good: how to use prices to promote equity, effi-
ciency, and sustainability, in: Water Policy 4, 1–17 
Benefit-sharing in dam projects on shared rivers 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 37 
SADC (Southern African Development Community) (s. a.): Criteria and indicators for regional interventions 
in SADC (on file with authors) 
Sadoff, C. W. / D. Grey (2002): Beyond the river: The benefits of cooperation on international rivers, in: 
Water Policy 4 (5), 389–403 
–/ – (2005): Cooperation on international rivers: a continuum for securing and sharing benefits, in: Water 
International 30, 420–427 
Scudder, T. (2003): The Aswan High Dam case, unpublished manuscript, s. l. 
– (2005): The Kariba case study, Pasadena: California Institute of Technology (Working Paper 1227) 
Song, J. / D. Whittington (2004): Why have some countries on international rivers been successful at negoti-
ating treaties? A global perspective, in: Water Resources Research 40: W05S06, doi:10.1029/ 
2003WR002536. 
Tremmel, M. et al. (1995): The people of the great river, in: The Aisling Magazine 17, Samhain; online: 
http://www.aislingmagazine.com/aislingmagazine/articles/TAM17/River.html (accessed 29 Nov. 2011) 
Tumbare, M. J. (2002): Co-operation in the Zambezi River Basin, in: Al Baz et al. (eds.), Co-operation on 
transboundary rivers, Nomos: Baden-Baden, 101–112 
Vaz, A. C. / P. van der Zaag (s. a.): Sharing the Incomati waters: cooperation and competition in the balance, 
s. l.: UNESCO 
Waterbury, J. (1979): Hydropolitics of the Nile valley, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press 
– (1997): Between unilateralism and comprehensive accords: modest steps toward cooperation in interna-
tional river basins, in: International Journal of Water Resources Development 13 (3), 279–289 
WCD (World Commission on Dams) (2000a): Dams and development, A new framework for decision-
making, London, Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publ. Ltd 
– (2000b): Kariba Dam Zambia and Zimbabwe, final report; online: http://www.dams.org/docs/ 
kbase/studies/cszzmain.pdf (accessed 31 July 2011) 
Whittington, D. / E. McClelland (1992): Opportunities for regional and international cooperation in the Nile 
basin, in: Water International 17 (3), 144–154 
– / X. Wu et al. (2005): Water resources management in the Nile basin: The economic value of cooperation, 
in: Water Policy 7, 227–252 
Wolf, A. T. (2004): Regional water cooperation as confidence building: water management as a strategy for 
peace, Adelphi Research, the Mesoamerican Center for Sustainable Development of the Dry Tropics at 
the National University of Costa Rica, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: The Envi-
ronmental Change and Security Project (ECSP)  
World Bank (2001): Operational policy 4.12: Involuntary resettlement; Operational policy 4.12, Annex A: 
Involuntary resettlement instruments; Bank procedure 4.12: Involuntary resettlement; online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTSAFEPOL/0,,conte
ntMDK:20543978~menuPK:1286647~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:584435,00.html 
(accessed 31 July 2011) 
– (2007): Africa region: irrigation business plan, revised draft, Washington, DC 
– (2009): Directions in hydropower, Washington, DC: World Bank Group 
World Energy Council (2007): World Energy Book Issue 3; online: http://www.worldenergy. 
org/publications/126.asp (accessed 29 Nov. 2011)  
WSSD (World Summit on Sustainable Development) (2002): Plan of implementation; online: http://www. 
johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/summit_docs/2309_plan final.htm (accessed 14 Dec. 2011) 
Yu, W. H. (2011): Benefit sharing in international rivers: findings from the Senegal River Basin, the Colum-
bia River Basin, and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Washington, DC: World Bank 
Zeitoun, M. / A. Jägerskog (2011): Addressing power asymmetry: how transboundary water management 
may serve to reduce poverty, Stockholm: SIWI (Report 29)  
ZRA (Zambia River Authority) (1987): Agreement between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the Republic of 
Zambia concerning the utilization of the Zambezi River; online: http://www.law.co.zw /down 
loads/statutes/20/Zambezi %20River%20Authority%20Act.pdf (accessed 3 Aug. 2011) 
 
Publications of the German Development Institute 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 
Messner, Dirk / Imme Scholz (eds.): Zukunftsfragen der Entwicklungspolitik, 410 p., 
Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-1005-0 
Neubert, Susanne / Waltina Scheumann / Annette van Edig, / Walter Huppert (eds.): Inte-
griertes Wasserressourcen-Management (IWRM): Ein Konzept in die Praxis 
überführen, 314 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-1111-1 
Brandt, Hartmut / Uwe Otzen: Armutsorientierte landwirtschaftliche und ländliche Ent-
wicklung, 342 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-0555-3 
Liebig, Klaus: Internationale Regulierung geistiger Eigentumsrechte und Wissenserwerb 
in Entwicklungsländern: Eine ökonomische Analyse, 233 p., Nomos, Baden-
Baden 2007, ISBN 978-3-8329-2379-2 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungs-
politik 1) 
Schlumberger, Oliver: Autoritarismus in der arabischen Welt: Ursachen, Trends und in-
ternationale Demokratieförderung, 225 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 
978-3-8329-3114-8 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 2) 
Qualmann, Regine: South Africa’s Reintegration into World and Regional Markets: Trade 
Liberalization and Emerging Patterns of Specialization in the Post-Apartheid Era, 
206 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 978-3-8329-2995-4 (Entwicklungsthe-
orie und Entwicklungspolitik 3) 
Loewe, Markus: Soziale Sicherung, informeller Sektor und das Potenzial von 
Kleinstversicherungen, 221 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2009, ISBN 978-3-8329-4017-
1 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 4) 
Loewe, Markus: Soziale Sicherung in den arabischen Ländern: Determinanten, Defizite und 
Strategien für den informellen Sektor, 286 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2010, ISBN 
978-3-8329-5586-1 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 7) 
Faust, Jörg / Susanne Neubert (Hrsg.): Wirksamere Entwicklungspolitik: Befunde, Reformen, 
Instrumente, 432 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2010, ISBN 978-3-8329-5587-8 (Ent-
wicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 8) 
[Books may be ordered only through publishing house or bookshops.] 
Book Series with Routledge 
Brandt, Hartmut / Uwe Otzen: Poverty Orientated Agricultural and Rural Development,   
342 p., Routledge, London 2007, ISBN 978-0-415-36853-7 (Studies in Develop-
ment and Society 12) 
Krause, Matthias: The Political Economy of Water and Sanitation, 282 p., Routledge, Lon-
don 2009, ISBN 978-0-415-99489-7 (Studies in Development and Society 20) 
[Books may be ordered only through publishing house or bookshops.] 
Springer-Verlag 
Scheumann, Waltina / Susanne Neubert / Martin Kipping (eds.): Water Politics and De-
velopment Cooperation: Local Power Plays and Global Governance, 416 p., Ber-
lin 2008, ISBN 978-3-540-76706-0 
Studies 
64 Ashoff, Guido et al.: Evaluación del „Fondo de planificación estratégica e 
implementación de reformas autofinanciadas en Chile”, 92 p., Bonn 2012, ISBN 
978-3-88985-501-5 
63 Ashoff, Guido et al.: Evaluierung des deutsch-chilenischen “Fonds zur strategi-
schen Planung und Umsetzung eigenfinanzierter Reformen”, 94 p., Bonn 2012, 
ISBN 978-3-88985-500-8 
62 Fues, Thomas / LIU Youfa: Global Governance and Building a Harmonious World: 
A comparison of European and Chinese concepts for international affairs, 215 p., 
Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-88985-499-5 
61 Weikert, Jochen: Re-defining ‘Good Business’ in the Face of Asian Drivers of 
Global Change: China and the Global Corporate Social Responsibility Discussion, 
378 p., Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-88985-497-1 
60 Hampel-Milagrosa, Aimée: The Role of Regulation, Tradition and Gender in Do-
ing Business: Case study and survey report on a two-year project in Ghana, 77 p., 
Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-88985-496-4 
59 Weinlich, Silke: Reforming Development Cooperation at the United Nations: An 
analysis of policy position and actions of major states on reform options, 134 p., 
Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-88985-495-7 
58 Chahoud, Tatjana et al.: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Black Eco-
nomic Empowerment (BEE) in South Africa: A case study of German Transna-
tional Corporations, 100 p., Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-88985-494-0 
57 Neubert, Susanne et al.: Agricultural Development in a Changing Climate in  
Zambia: Increasing resilience to climate change and economic shocks in crop pro-
duction, 244 p., Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-88985-493-3 
56 Grimm, Sven et al.: Coordinating China and DAC Development Partners: Chal-
lenges to the aid architecture in Rwanda, 200 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-
492-6 
 [Price: 10,00 Euro; books may be ordered directly from the DIE or through bookshops.] 
Discussion Paper 
  4/2012 Marino, Robert / Ulrich Volz: A Critical Review of the IMF’s Tools for Crisis 
Prevention, 38 p., Bonn 2012, ISBN 978-3-88985-547-3 
  3/2012 Grävingholt, Jörn / Sebastian Ziaja / Merle Kreibaum: State Fragility: Towards 
a Multi-Dimensional Empirical Typology, 38 p., Bonn 2012, ISBN 978-3-
88985-546-6 
  2/2012 Dafe, Florence: The Politics of Central Banking and Implications for Regula-
tory Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: The cases of Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, 
38 p., Bonn 2012, ISBN 978-3-88985-545-9 
  1/2012 Weimer, Bernhard: Municipal Tax Base in Mozambique: High Potential – Low 
Degree of Utilisation, 48 p., Bonn 2012, ISBN 978-3-88985-544-2 
14/2011 Stephen Chan OBE: Mercy and the Structures of the World: Third Hans Singer 
Memorial Lecture on Global Development, 32 p., Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-
88985-542-8 
[Price: 6,00 Euro; books may be ordered directly from the DIE or through bookshops.] 
A complete list of publications available from DIE can be found at: 
http://www.die-gdi.de 
